Entry of a default PPO; Non-domestic PPO; MCL 600.2950a; “Stalking”; MCL 750.411h(1)(d); “Harassment”; MCL 750.411h(1)(c); “Unconsented contact”; MCL 750.411h(1)(e); Failure to allege respondent engaged in two or more separate noncontinuous acts; Intentional “course of conduct”; MCL 750.411h(1)(a); Burden of proof; Violation of the stalking statute; “Conduct that serves a legitimate purpose”; Denial of the presence of a key witness

Concluding the trial court did not abuse its discretion in granting petitioner-LW a non-domestic PPO against respondents-SCM and KJL, the court affirmed in both cases. KJL argued the trial court abused its discretion by entering a default PPO against him. The court held that “the trial court did not abuse its discretion by prohibiting KJL from appearing virtually while he had outstanding warrants. Further, because the default was not entered as a sanction and was instead entered based upon KJL’s failure to defend, the court was not required to discuss alternative, less drastic sanctions on the record before entering the default.” SCM argued “the trial court abused its discretion by granting petitioner’s request for a PPO against him.” SCM contended “the petition failed to allege that he engaged in two or more separate noncontinuous acts.” The petition alleged that “(1) SCM, while acting on behalf of his stepson KJL, delivered multiple subpoenas to petitioner, (2) that each time he was posing as a process server SCM video recorded details of petitioner’s current and prior residence, and (3) he provided the video footage to KJL to post online so that petitioner would be harassed and intimidated. During the hearing that followed, petitioner testified that there were four instances of such conduct on SCM’s part. Petitioner thus alleged an intentional course of conduct consisting of four separate noncontinuous events.” SCM next asserted “the trial court’s statement, ‘Absent any evidence to the contrary,’ implied that SCM had the burden to disprove the allegations in the petition.” However, viewed in context, it was clear the trial court’s “statement was only an indication that the evidence presented by petitioner in support of his claim was unrebutted. The court did not improperly shift the burden.” Next, SCM argued the trial court erred by holding that he violated the stalking statute “because harassment does not include ‘conduct that serves a legitimate purpose.’” But the court determined that “SCM’s videos captured more than service of process upon petitioner for appearances not actually required of him, and the videos were quickly relayed to KJL who published them online to further a campaign of harassment that had previously resulted in a PPO against KJL. This evidence supported the trial court’s conclusion that SCM’s service or subpoenas upon petitioner for KJL was pretextual and actually used to gain information about petitioner’s residence.”