Motion to terminate an ex parte PPO; Domestic relationship PPO; MCL 600.2950(1) & (4); Hayford v Hayford; Brand v Brandt

Holding that the trial court did not abuse its discretion in denying respondent’s motion to terminate an ex parte domestic relationship PPO obtained by petitioner, the court affirmed. Respondent contended the trial court’s finding that he “engaged in coercive control over petitioner and expressed disproportionate anger is not conduct contemplated under the statutory text of MCL 600.2950(1) because the term ‘coercive control’ is not” found in the statute. While he was correct about the absence of the phrase “in the statute, the relevant inquiry is whether the factual findings were based on conduct it found respondent to have engaged in and that the conduct falls within the statutory prohibitions. What term or phrase was attributed to that conduct is essentially meaningless, particularly when the statute contains a catch-all clause opening the list of prohibited conduct to ‘[a]ny other specific act or conduct that imposes upon or interferes with personal liberty or that causes a reasonable apprehension of violence.’” The court concluded respondent’s interpretation ignored the fact that MCL 600.2950(1)(l) permits a trial court to consider “any other action that ‘interferes with personal liberty’ or might cause ‘a reasonable apprehension of violence.’” As to the trial court’s factual basis for its decision, “the testimony presented at the evidentiary hearing was sufficient for the court to find reasonable cause to believe that respondent engaged in conduct that caused petitioner a reasonable apprehension of violence.” The court concluded the evidence about an 8/21 argument and a 12/21 “incident, showed behavior that escalated from yelling to at least implied threats. Although there was no allegation of physical violence, the trial court further found that ‘respondent has broken items in the home, has threatened [petitioner] through coercive control techniques, and has shown disproportionate anger.’” Given its credibility determination in petitioner’s favor, and the evidence she presented, “the trial court did not clearly err in finding that respondent’s actions caused petitioner to have a reasonable apprehension of violence.” The court concluded it did not clearly err in “finding reasonable cause to believe that respondent might commit one of the prohibited acts under MCL 600.2950(1), and the denial of respondent’s motion to terminate the PPO fell within the range of principled outcomes.”