Criminal contempt for failure to comply with a domestic PPO issued under MCL 600.2950; Sufficiency of the evidence; Identity; Tags, posts, & similar means of electronic communication (e.g., email, text) as “contacts” between the sender & recipient; Buchanan v Crisler; Freedom of speech as to a domestic PPO; MCL 600.2950(1)(j); MCL 750.411h(1)(c); Timing of appeal; MCR 3.709(B); MCR 7.204(A)(1); Collateral attack; Workers’ Comp Agency Dir v MacDonald’s Indus Prod, Inc; The “transparently invalid” exception; Distinguishing In re Providence Journal Co (Providence I) (1st Cir); Stalking; MCL 750.411h & i; Good-time credit; MCL 51.282; People v Cannon

The court held that respondent’s conviction for criminal contempt survived his challenges on appeal, and his claim that his separate sentences were de facto consecutive sentences was moot. But “the local sheriff’s policy of categorically prohibiting certain offenders from earning good-time credit—i.e., those incarcerated for contempt of court—runs directly contrary to” MCL 51.282. Petitioner obtained several domestic PPOs against respondent. One issued in 2016 barred respondent from stalking her. The trial court denied his motion to terminate the PPO. In 2019 it found him guilty of violating the PPO by “tagging” petitioner on a comment made on a Facebook profile with the name of his deceased father. Petitioner obtained another PPO against respondent in 2020, and the trial court sentenced him “on several separate occasions for criminal contempt.” The sentencing orders stated he was not entitled to any good-time credit. The court rejected his argument that the trial court abused its discretion by finding he violated the 2016 PPO, noting the record did not support his claim there was a stipulation for the trial court to consider only pages 8 to 12 of Exhibit A, which included the Facebook “tag” of petitioner. The court also held that there was “sufficient evidence supporting the trial court’s factual finding that [he] was responsible for making the offending post.” It next rejected his contention the 2016 PPO violated his freedom of speech. “First, the time for directly attacking the 2016 PPO has passed.” His claim in this appeal was “a collateral attack on the 2016 PPO, and for this reason alone, the claim fails.” Second, his “attempt to skirt the collateral-attack rule” lacked merit. Even on its own terms, “Providence I does not support [his] position on appeal.” Third, even if the court “were to reach the merits, the 2016 PPO was not transparently invalid. The order prohibited [respondent] from, among other things, stalking” petitioner. The statute “specifically exempts ‘constitutionally protected activity’ from the scope of harassment that can constitute stalking. There is no language in the order that could, on its face, be construed as a prior restraint.” Because the trial court found respondent “in contempt for electronically contacting [petitioner], rather than for the content of the speech he used to do so, the contempt finding did not violate” his right to free speech. However, by ordering in advance that he “was categorically prohibited from earning good-time credit, the trial court violated MCL 51.282(2).” Affirmed in part, reversed in part, and remanded.