FIP; Waiver of a Second Amendment argument; Whether defendant was aware of United States v Williams; Waiver validity; United States v Ruiz; Sentencing; Applicability of the enhancement under USSG § 2K2.1(a)(3) for using a semiautomatic gun capable of accepting a large capacity magazine; Whether there is a state-of-mind requirement; United States v Sands; Enhancement for using a firearm in connection with another offense; § 2K2.1(b)(6)(B); Proximity of the gun to a large quantity of drugs

[This appeal was from the WD-MI.] The court held that defendant-Seuell knowingly waived his right to assert a Second Amendment challenge and that USSG § 2K2.1(a)(3) (using a semiautomatic that could be used with a large capacity magazine) does not have a state-of-mind requirement. Seuell was arrested on an outstanding warrant. When his car was impounded, drugs and a loaded semiautomatic were found. He pled guilty to FIP and was sentenced to 70 months. Seuell challenged his conviction on Second-Amendment grounds. But the court held that he waived this argument during sentencing. He asked his attorney to file a motion to dismiss on the ground the statute was unconstitutional as applied to him but the attorney refused. The district court then offered to appoint another attorney for Seuell, but he declined, saying he did not want to cause trouble. The judge explained that it was no trouble and reiterated the offer, but Seuell stated that he wanted to proceed with sentencing. The court rejected Seuell’s claim that he did not waive the challenge because he was not aware “that he could protest his dangerousness” under Williams. It found that “the transcript makes clear that the Williams decision was a significant factor in the district court’s colloquy with Seuell. And a waiver is valid so long as a defendant knows the ‘nature of the right and how it would likely apply in general in the circumstances.’” Seuell next challenged application of the § 2K2.1(a)(3) sentencing enhancement, claiming it did “not apply because he did not know that his pistol could carry enough ammunition to count as accepting a large capacity magazine.” But the court noted that the statute “does not contain a state-of-mind requirement. It requires an enhancement whenever the firearm qualifies.” It added that “the Sentencing Commission knew how to add a state-of-mind requirement when it wished to do so.” And in Sands the court “described a related firearm enhancement that lacked a state-of-mind element as a ‘[s]trict liability enhancement.’” Further, every “circuit to interpret this provision has recognized that it does not contain a state-of-mind requirement.” The court also upheld application of the § 2K2.1(b)(6)(B) enhancement for committing another felony offense, rejecting his claim that there was no connection shown between his pistol and drug trafficking where “the proximity of the gun to the large quantity of drugs suffices to make the connection.” Affirmed.