Jurisdiction over the child; “Abandonment”; MCL 712A.2(b)(1); “Desertion”; “Proper custody or guardianship”; MCL 712A.2(b)(2); Unfit home environment; Distinguishing In re Ernst & In re Baham; Reasonable efforts to prevent removal

Noting that “the term ‘abandoned’ is not statutorily defined and there is no binding caselaw defining the word in the context of MCL 712A.2(b)[,]” the court held that the act of abandonment under the statute “must be an intentional act on the part of the parent to give up his or her rights to the child.” It concluded that the record supported the trial court’s finding that there were no statutory grounds for jurisdiction here. Thus, it affirmed the order declining to exercise jurisdiction over respondents’ child. Petitioner-DHHS suggested that “‘abandonment’ is synonymous with ‘desertion,’ which has been defined as an intentional and willful act.” But the court did not agree “the Legislature intended for ‘abandonment’ and ‘desertion’ to be used interchangeably in MCL 712A.2(b). Unlike MCL 712A.19b(3), which uses both ‘abandonment’ and ‘deserted’ in different subdivisions setting forth the statutory grounds for termination of a parent’s parental rights, MCL 712A.2(b)(1) only uses the word ‘abandoned.’ ” Thus, the court only considered “whether the child was abandoned by respondents, not whether he was deserted.” It concluded “that the trial court did not clearly err by finding that jurisdiction was not warranted on the basis that” either respondent “intended to abandon the child.” As to the proper custody or guardianship claim, the court held that while “respondents may not have made the best decisions, the grandparents unilaterally removed the child to Michigan—without clear evidence of legal authority to do so—and little effort was made by petitioner to reunify the family.” The trial “court found that removing a child without legal authority and failing to provide respondents with assistance to retrieve the child could not support the exercise of jurisdiction. That decision was not clearly erroneous.” As to the unfit home environment claim, the DHHS “failed to present conclusive evidence regarding substance abuse after the child’s birth.” Finally, the court noted that the “trial court’s acknowledgement of petitioner’s failure to make reasonable efforts to prevent removal . . . came after it had already determined that the evidence presented did not support any of the cited statutory grounds to exercise jurisdiction under MCL 712A.2(b).” And even if it “improperly considered the lack of reasonable efforts to prevent removal as part of the decision, that error was not outcome determinative given that [its] findings that there were not statutory grounds for jurisdiction were amply supported by the record in this case.”