Whistleblowers’ Protection Act (the WPA); Whether reporting a violation of the common law is protected activity under MCL 15.362; Whether “law” as used in “a violation or a suspected violation of a law” includes the common law

The court held that “to receive protection under MCL 15.362, an employee must report a violation or a suspected violation of a law or regulation or rule promulgated pursuant to law. When given its plain and ordinary meaning, the term ‘law’ [as used in the statutory phrase ‘a violation or a suspected violation of a law’] includes the common law.” Thus, it reversed the Court of Appeals’ decision, but remanded the “case to the Court of Appeals for consideration of whether gross negligence is a violation of ‘a’ law and whether” plaintiff-Stefanski’s “conduct constituted a report under MCL 15.362.” Stefanski was a former employee of defendant-Saginaw County 911. He was placed on a 90-day unpaid suspension. “Believing that the reason for his suspension was pretextual, [he] resigned and filed” this case, alleging a violation of MCL 15.362. At issue was “whether the statutory phrase ‘a violation or a suspected violation of a law or regulation or rule promulgated pursuant to law of this state, a political subdivision of this state, or the United States’” includes a violation of the common law. Stefanski argued “that a violation of the common law is a violation of a law under MCL 15.362.” Because the WPA does not define “law,” the court turned “to dictionary definitions to ascertain the word’s plain meaning.” In sum, it concluded that “the word ‘law’ as used in MCL 15.362 encompasses the common law, whether understood as a term of art or in its ordinary sense. This interpretation aligns with the WPA’s broader purpose of public protection, which is achieved ‘by protecting the whistleblowing employee and by removing barriers that may interdict employee efforts to report violations or suspected violations of the law.’” The court held that “MCL 15.362 does not limit the word ‘law.’ It does not say ‘statutory law’ or ‘constitutional law’; it merely states ‘a law.’ As explained, the plain and ordinary definition of ‘law’ encompasses the common law. The statutory interpretation of the WPA urged by Saginaw County 911 would exclude a large subset of law, which, in turn, would undermine the WPA’s purpose. If we were to exclude the common law from MCL 15.362, we would be imposing a limiting barrier that is not found in the statute. Under this construction, employees would have to worry about whether the law they suspect has been violated is a part of this excluded subset, thus eliminating their access to any protection under the WPA. Such a construction is impermissible and inconsistent with our mandate to liberally construe the WPA as a remedial statute.”

Justice Zahra dissented, believing that “the majority opinion improperly holds that common law is ‘a law’ under the WPA and exponentially expands the violations that the Legislature intended employees to be able to report without fear of losing employment.”