Jurisdiction over a child; 712A.2(b)(1) & (2); “Neglect”; MCL 722.602(1)(d); “When able to do so,” “able,” & “negligent treatment”; In re Hockett; Deference owed to a trial court’s decision

Holding that the trial court did not err by finding no basis for jurisdiction over the child, the court reversed the Court of Appeals judgment to the contrary and remanded to the trial court. The DHHS petitioned to take jurisdiction over the child (who had serious psychological issues) after respondent-mother refused to pick him up from the hospital (where he was awaiting inpatient psychiatric treatment) because she felt that bringing him home would pose a significant risk to himself, her other children, their pets, and herself. The trial court determined that a preponderance of the evidence did not support jurisdiction. The Court of Appeals reversed, finding that both 2(b)(1) and (2) were met. The court disagreed, noting respondent “did not have sufficient power, skill, or resources to have [the child] return and stay at home because he posed a danger to the other members of the household, as well as himself. Even had [she] worked with DHHS to obtain outpatient services, those services had failed in the past, and there was no indication that such services would provide respondent with sufficient power, skill, or resources to enable [him] to live at home safely, especially given [he] did not receive treatment during his most recent hospital stay.” In addition, respondent’s treatment of the child did not satisfy the “definition of ‘negligent.’” She has been trying to get him “the treatment he needs, as any reasonably prudent person in her circumstance would have. Refusing to take [him] home under the circumstances was precisely what an ordinarily and reasonably prudent person would do, given [he] posed a danger to himself and others if taken home. Past experience indicated that even if [the child] were provided outpatient treatment, he would still pose a danger to the household.” Finally, while the court agreed that the facts of this case and Hockett are similar, and the Court of Appeals was certainly right to look to it, “it should have remained mindful of the deference owed to the trial court’s decision.”

Justice Cavanagh concurred but wrote separately, asking the Legislature “to consider creating a no-fault procedure that allows the state to intervene without requiring courts to adjudicate parents as unfit when they are struggling to support children with complex mental health needs,” noting that “[r]eform is needed, or parents and children will continue to suffer.”

Justice Bernstein concurred in part and dissented in part, agreeing with the majority that the trial court did not abuse its discretion, but noting its “analysis of culpability with respect to MCL 712A.2(b)(2) is insufficient, and to the extent that the majority suggests that MCL 712A.2(b)(3) ‘may’ provide an adequate basis to obtain jurisdiction over” the child, he disagreed.

Justice Zahra dissented, noting his belief that “a parent who causes their child to become homeless has in fact neglected or abandoned the child. Further, the notion adopted by the majority opinion—that a parent can dictate the scope and extent of a treatment plan—is not supported by statute and is certain to create more problems than it purports to solve.”