Termination under § 19b(3)(i); Separation of adjudicative & dispositional phases; Supplemental petition

The court held that “the trial court did not plainly err in its separation of the adjudicative from the dispositional phases of a termination proceeding.” Also, it “did not plainly err by failing to require a supplemental petition.” Thus, it affirmed the trial court order terminating respondent-mother’s parental rights to the minor child under § (i). She contended “that the trial court procedurally erred by failing to properly separate the adjudicative and dispositional phases of the termination proceeding and by failing to require DHHS to file a supplemental petition when the request for termination did not occur at the initial dispositional hearing.” The court disagreed. It found that the “trial court did not plainly err in the procedure it followed regarding the separation of an adjudicative phase from a dispositional phase of a termination proceeding initiated by a petition. Instead, the trial court advised the parties two times before the start of the adjudication hearing of its intent to decide only the issue of jurisdiction. It further explained its ‘typical’ action in not terminating the parental rights of a parent when the other parent acts as the custodian. And, although [it] may have later stated that the statutory ground for termination raised in the petition was satisfied, it then acknowledged, for the third time, that it was only deciding the issue of jurisdiction at the hearing.” The court noted that “the adjudicative phase ended when the trial court exercised jurisdiction over the child at the bench trial in [4/24], despite the trial court’s determination that a statutory ground for termination existed at the same hearing.” Thus, the “adjudicative phase preceded the dispositional phase.” Also, it found that “the dispositional hearing and the adjudicative trial were not ‘converged such that there [was] no distinction.’” Rather, the court noted that “the trial court made its jurisdiction and termination decisions at separate hearings months apart: at a trial in April and at the best-interest hearing in August, respectively. Moreover, at the dispositional hearing in [5/24], the trial court did not terminate respondent’s rights, but ordered that she comply with a case service plan.” As to the supplemental petition, “DHHS petitioned to terminate respondent’s rights in its initial petition. However, the trial court did not terminate her rights at the initial dispositional hearing, but at the end of a best-interest hearing several months later. [It] did not plainly err by failing to require the filing of a supplemental petition for termination. Under the court rules, DHHS was not required to file [one]. The initial petition included a request for termination and no allegations existed on the record of ‘one or more circumstances new or different from the offense that led the court to take jurisdiction.’” The court also noted, among other things, that “under MCL 712A.19b(4), a trial court ‘may’ order the termination of a parent’s rights at the initial dispositional hearing, but is not required to do so.”