Right to present a complete defense; Jury instructions; Accident instruction; M Crim JI 7.3a; Prosecutorial error; Improper vouching; Closing argument; Ineffective assistance of counsel; Opinion testimony; MRE 701 & 702; Authentication; MRE 901(b); Vocal identification; Sufficiency of the evidence; Felonious assault; People v Nix

Finding no errors requiring reversal, the court affirmed defendant’s convictions. He was convicted of felonious assault and reckless driving arising out of a road rage incident in which he struck the side of the victims’ car with his truck. On appeal, the court first found that, “[i]n light of the record, particularly defendant’s extensive denials of any contact between the vehicles, the trial court did not abuse its discretion by concluding that there was no factual support to warrant the accident instruction.” It next found that the prosecution did not commit error by improperly bolstering a witness’s (M) testimony or by making improper arguments in closing arguments. The prosecution’s question about whether M had any bias or interest in the matter that impacted his credibility “was pertinent when considered in its context, and the prosecution’s question did not improperly bolster” M's credibility and its “characterization of defendant’s gesture was a reasonable inference.” In addition, he was not denied the effective assistance of counsel. The court further found that the trial court did not err by allowing the police chief to testify that defendant was the individual he spoke to on the phone and to the nature of the collision without being qualified as an expert. Because the police chief “reached a reliable conclusion that a layperson could make without specialized knowledge, the trial court did not abuse its discretion by allowing this testimony.” And again, counsel was not ineffective because “[d]eclining to strike jurors who have stated they will remain impartial does not fall below an objective standard of reasonableness.” Finally, the court found there was sufficient evidence to support defendant’s felonious assault convictions as “the jury could reasonably infer [he] intended to either injure the [victims] or cause them to fear an immediate battery.”