Personal protection insurance (PIP) benefits; Coverage dispute; Distinction between “residence” & “domicile”; Grange Ins Co of MI v Lawrence; Tienda v Integon Nat'l Ins Co; Fraud; MCL 500.4503; Standard for showing fraud made in connection with a claim submitted to the Michigan Automobile Insurance Placement Facility (MAIPF); Required showing that false information was submitted

The court held that there was a genuine issue of material fact as to where plaintiff-CD “was residing at the time of the accident and as to whether he had more than once residence at that time.” A genuine issue of material fact also existed as to where he was domiciled. And resolving these fact questions was “necessary in order to determine whether CD was entitled to the claimed PIP benefits under” defendant-Farmers’ policy and whether CD’s guardian and conservator (Harvey), “on behalf of CD, committed fraud in connection with his claims.” Thus, the court affirmed the trial court’s denial of Farmers’ summary disposition motion but reversed its grant of defendant-Nationwide’s (the MAIPF assigned insurer) motion “because the same fact questions foreclose a finding that fraud was committed as a matter of law in connection with the MAIPF application.” Due to his injuries after being struck by a hit-and-run driver, CD was placed under the guardianship of his parents. Harvey is his father. At the time of the accident, his parents had the Farmers policy, which extended PIP “benefits to family members of the insureds who resided in the same household.” Farmers argued that there was “no genuine issue of material fact as to where CD was domiciled at the time of the accident.” Noting the distinction between “residence” and “domicile,” the court found that “CD’s entitlement to benefits under the policy turns on where he was residing at the time of the accident.” The fact that he “may have resided at the Livonia address does not, in itself, mean that he did not also reside at the West Bloomfield address at that same time. Based on the record, there is a genuine issue of material fact as to whether CD resided at the West Bloomfield address, Livonia address, or both.” And it added that, “even if CD’s domicile at the time of the accident were the relevant inquiry in this case, there is a genuine issue of material fact as to where CD was domiciled at that time.” As to Farmers’ fraud argument, the genuine issue of material fact as to “where CD resided and where he was domiciled at the time of the accident” likewise created one as to “whether fraud was committed.” And while the standard for showing fraud “in connection with a claim submitted to the MAIPF differs in some ways from the general standard” for insurance fraud, both standards “require a showing that false information was submitted.” Thus, Nationwide was also not entitled to summary disposition. Affirmed in part, reversed in part, and remanded.