Fiduciary accountings; MCL 700.5501(3)(c) & (f); Expenses listed in second amended first & second accountings; “Good faith”; Decision making as an attorney-in-fact; Attorney fees; Home sale proceeds

The court held that the “probate court did not abuse its discretion by partially denying the expenses listed in [petitioner-Mifsud’s] second amended first and second accountings.” Also, it found that “the probate court’s denial of attorney fees was not outside the range of reasonable and principled outcomes.” Finally, its “finding that Mifsud incorrectly accounted for the sale proceeds in her second amended accountings was not clearly erroneous, and its order requiring that the full amount of the” proceeds be returned to her mother, BJH, “was not outside the range of reasonable and principled outcomes.” Mifsud appealed the probate court’s 6/1/23 order granting in part and denying in part her “fiduciary accountings of her disputed actions as attorney-in-fact for her mother, BJH; denying Mifsud’s request that attorney fees she incurred in connection with the accountings be paid from BJH’s estate; and ordering [her] to return to BJH proceeds from the sale of BJH’s home.” She argued “that the probate court abused its discretion by partially denying expenses in her second amended first and second accountings because she provided evidence substantiating all of the expenses during the specified time frames and because she acted in good faith as BJH’s attorney-in-fact when she made the expenses.” The court noted that the “power of attorney does not expressly define the term ‘good faith,’ but Black’s Law Dictionary (12th ed.) defines it, in part, as ‘[a] state of mind consisting in (1) honesty in belief or purpose, (2) faithfulness to one’s duty or obligation.’” The court found that the record evidence supported “the conclusion that Mifsud did not meet this standard in her conduct and decision making as BJH’s attorney-in-fact.” It also revealed “no clear error in the probate court’s findings regarding the amounts of the expenses in [her] accountings that should be denied.” The court was “not definitely and firmly convinced that the probate court made a mistake in its findings.” Thus, it held that the probate court did not abuse its discretion. Affirmed.