Sentencing; Mandatory life in prison without the possibility of parole (LWOP) for first-degree murder; MCL 750.316; Extension of People v Parks to defendants who were 19 or 20 when they committed the crime; Michigan’s prohibition against “cruel or unusual punishment” (Const 1963, art 1, § 16); Proportionality; People v Lorentzen; People v Bullock; Retroactivity; People v Poole; The continued viability of People v Hall

The court extended “Parks to individuals who were 19 or 20 years old at the time of the crime for which they were convicted.” It held that applying a mandatory LWOP sentence under MCL 750.316 to defendants-Czarnecki and Taylor (aged 19 and 20, respectively, at the time of their crimes) constituted “unconstitutionally harsh and disproportionate punishment and thus ‘cruel’ punishment in violation of Const 1963, art 1, § 16.” The court evaluated the proportionality of defendants’ sentences using the factors set forth in Lorentzen and Bullock. It concluded that late “adolescents who are 19 or 20 years old, as a class, share with 18-year-olds the same mitigating characteristics of late-adolescent brain development. The same considerations that were discussed at length in Parks apply equally to this class of late adolescents. Accordingly, as applied to defendants who were 19 or 20 years old at the time of their crime, a mandatory LWOP sentence that does not allow for consideration of the mitigating factors of youth or the potential for rehabilitation is a grossly disproportionate punishment in violation of Const 1963, art 1, § 16.” As a result, both defendants, who were subject to the mandatory sentence of LWOP attached to first-degree murder under MCL 750.316, were “entitled to be resentenced in the manner set forth in MCL 769.25 and” relevant case law. The court noted that in Poole, it “held that Parks applies retroactively to criminal cases on collateral review.” While the cases here were before it “on direct review, the Poole retroactivity analysis applies with equal force to this decision. There is no logical justification for applying Parks retroactively to cases on collateral review and not doing the same for the holding reached in these cases involving 19- and 20-year-olds. Therefore, our decision in these cases applies retroactively to cases on collateral review.” The court also considered the continued viability of its 1976 decision in Hall. While it questioned “how much of Hall’s analysis remains viable given the sea change of federal and state precedent interpreting US Const, Am VIII, and Const 1963, art 1, § 16, since” it was decided, the court concluded that it need not overrule Hall here. Thus, it did “not disturb, at this time, Hall’s holding that Const 1963, art 1, § 16 permits a mandatory punishment of LWOP for defendants convicted of first-degree murder, so long as the defendant was at least 21 years of age at the time of the offense.”

Concurring in part and dissenting in part, Justice Bernstein wrote separately to express his “reasons for disagreeing with a bright-line rule drawn at age 21[.]” First, he cited “the problem of underinclusiveness that is associated with drawing a bright-line rule; and second,” found that if doing so were necessary, he would “draw such a line at age 25.”

Dissenting, Chief Justice Clement (joined by Justice Zahra) found that the majority extended “Parks though the Constitution does not require it.” As she did in Parks, she again disagreed “with the majority’s analysis of the Lorentzen factors and do not believe that the evidence supports the conclusion that mandatory LWOP for 19- and 20-year-olds violates Const 1963, art 1, § 16.”