Respondeat superior; Scope of employment; Negligent hiring, training, management, or supervision

Concluding “that the security guard was not acting within the scope of his employment when he shot plaintiffs,” the court reversed “the trial court’s denial of summary disposition of plaintiffs’ respondeat superior claim.” But it determined “that the trial court did not err when it denied summary disposition of plaintiffs’ claim of negligent hiring, training, management, or supervision,” so it affirmed that part of the trial court’s order and remanded. A security guard who was working for defendant-Greenfield Joy, “doing business as U.S. Quality Food Super Market, shot a customer and her boyfriend just outside defendant’s store.” Defendant contended “that the security guard’s actions in shooting plaintiffs were not within the scope of his employment, so defendant cannot be held vicariously liable for the shooting under the doctrine of respondeat superior.” The court agreed. It found that no evidence indicated “that, by the time of the shooting, the security guard was acting within the scope of his employment.” No evidence reflected that when he “shot plaintiffs, he was ‘engaged in the service of his master, or while about his master’s business,’ or that the security guard ‘accomplished the [shooting] in furtherance, or the interest, of the employer’s business.’” Conversely, evidence revealed that he “was acting to further his individual interest, i.e., to prove a personal point, self-defense, and to get revenge for [plaintiff-]McElrath threatening him. All the evidence about the security guard’s motive for the shooting reveals that he was motivated by purely personal reasons.” The evidence reflected “that the shooting was solely intended to further the security guard’s individual interests, and therefore was not within the scope of his employment.” Thus, the court found “no genuine issue of material fact as to whether [he] was acting within the scope of his employment with defendant when he shot plaintiffs, so defendant is entitled to summary disposition under MCR 2.116(C)(10). The trial court erred when it held otherwise.” As to plaintiffs’ claim of negligent hiring, training, management, or supervision, the court concluded that a “genuine issue of material fact exists as to the foreseeability that the security guard would shoot a customer in the midst of an altercation at the store. Despite telling the security guard that he could not carry the gun at work, defendant failed to take any further action aimed at preventing [him] from bringing the gun to work. This resulted in defendant employing a security guard who defied the request of his employer and insisted on carrying a gun, and who had received no training about the use of the gun. Thus, the trial court did not err by denying defendant’s motion for summary disposition of” this claim.