Quiet title action; Express easement; Termination of an easement due to impossibility; Distinguishing MacLeod v Hamilton; Construing the terms of a conveyance; Choals v Plummer

Holding that the trial court did not err by finding a valid express easement existed, but did err by expanding its geographic scope beyond what the chain of title supported, the court affirmed in part and reversed in part. The trial court entered an order quieting title in plaintiff to an easement one rod wide along the southeast border of “Parcel 1,” owned by defendant. On appeal, the court rejected defendant’s argument that the easement over Parcel 1-1909 terminated due to impossibility, and that even if an easement exists, it does not provide plaintiff access to St. Joseph Avenue. Distinguishing MacLeod, the court noted that defendant provided no evidence that plaintiff’s need for access to its parcel is any less real today than it was when the easement was created in 1909. “No alternative route to the parcel exists, meaning—under the MacLeod test—that the purpose for the creation of the easement is as present as ever. That contrasts MacLeod, where the ‘easement ha[d] been dormant and renounced by the county in the establishment of the drainage elsewhere.’” However, the court agreed with defendant regarding Parcel 1-1924, finding the 1953 conveyance did “not adequately communicate an intent to confer an easement across” it. The “history of the conveyances does not indicate an intent to create an express easement across what was formerly Parcel 1-1924.” In light of the “historical context,” the court found it “unlikely that the 1953 conveyance is evidence of an intention to expand the existing easement beyond its existing geographic boundaries.” While the “1909 conveyance unambiguously created an express easement across Parcel 1-1909, the 1953 conveyance does not unambiguously extend that easement across Parcel 1-1924. Given that ambiguity, the trial court erred in holding that plaintiff has an express easement across Parcel 1-1924.”