Sentencing; Proportionality; Consecutive sentences; Distinguishing People v Baskerville; People v Steanhouse; Testimony about other acts resulting in incarceration; Fair & impartial jury; Prejudice; Ineffective assistance of counsel; Failure to object to the victim’s statement about defendant’s earlier incarceration & move for a mistrial

The court concluded that defendant did not establish “that his challenged sentences were unreasonable or disproportionate to the circumstances of the offense and offender, and the trial court did not abuse its discretion when it sentenced [him] to consecutive sentences for” his CSC I convictions. Also, it held that “any error that occurred with the victim’s testimony” that defendant had gone to prison before “did not result in unfair prejudice.” Finally, he was not denied that effective assistance of counsel. He was convicted of AWIGBH, domestic violence, aggravated stalking, and CSC I. He was sentenced to consecutive prison terms of 30 to 60 years for the two CSC I “convictions, to be served concurrently with” his sentences for his other convictions. Defendant first argued that he was entitled to be resentenced because the consecutive sentences for the CSC I convictions were, in effect, a life sentence and disproportionate. The court concluded that “the trial court’s decision to impose consecutive sentencing served the purpose of protecting the public because it ensures that it will be very unlikely that defendant will have another [chance] to harm another victim. Additionally, the consecutive sentences will appropriately discipline [him] and provide general deterrence from committing sexual assaults.” Defendant argued “generally that sentencing does not deter others from committing similar offenses. The trial court properly treated general deterrence as a consideration in issuing consecutive sentences, because doubling the length of incarceration should, rationally, deter others from committing similar offenses. [His] consecutive sentences also serve the legitimate purposes of ensuring the protection of society from any further vicious crimes specifically by defendant, appropriately punishing [him] for his exploitative, violent, and unconscionable conduct, and generally deterring others from engaging in similar criminal behavior.” While he relied on Baskerville in arguing that the consecutive sentences were “‘overkill’ and disproportionate under the circumstances” here, the court “explained in Baskerville that when a trial court imposes consecutive sentences, our review concerns whether each individual sentence is proportionate, not the aggregate length of the combined sentences.” As a result, “when ‘the individual sentences do not exceed the maximum punishment allowed for each sentence, which is life imprisonment, . . . the aggregate of the sentences is not disproportionate.’” The maximum penalty for his CSC I convictions was life imprisonment. “Because the individual 30-year sentences do not exceed the maximum punishment allowed for each sentence, the aggregate of the sentences is not disproportionate.” Affirmed.