Other acts evidence; MCL 768.27b; Relevance; People v Watkins; Propensity; People v Hoskins; MRE 403 balancing test

The court held that the trial court: (1) “properly considered the probative value of [witness-WS’s] testimony against the danger it would cause unfair prejudice,” (2) “did not abuse its discretion by holding that WS’s testimony was admissible under MRE 403,” and (3) any error was harmless. Defendant-Hendges was convicted of CSC I and II involving victim-AC when she was 12. The “prosecution sought to admit evidence of [his] sexual assault of WS, an individual who was 19 . . . at the time and unrelated to AC.” Hendges argued that it erroneously admitted statutory other acts evidence (another sexual assault) without properly conducting the MRE 403 balancing test. “The prosecutor argued that WS’s testimony showed that Hendges engaged in a pattern of like behavior. While propensity evidence is typically inadmissible, WS’s testimony was about another sexual assault, and Hendges was accused of” CSC I and II in this case. The court acknowledged “that the trial court did not explicitly state its reasoning related to its weighing of each of the Watkins factors. But we have previously held that the trial court is not necessarily required to discuss the Watkins factors on the record.” It nonetheless concluded “that the trial court reached the correct result. The trial court cited MRE 403 and described the balancing test. It then decided that the prejudicial impact of WS’s testimony did not outweigh the testimony’s probative value.” Hendges argued that it “erred by not stating its analysis on the record.” However, he failed “to cite any law in support of his argument that the trial court must state its analysis on the record and fail[ed] to explain why our holding in Hoskins does not apply.” In addition, any error was harmless. Hendges argued “that the trial court should have excluded WS’s testimony under MRE 403 because it unfairly prejudiced him.” The court disagreed. “Overall, the other acts and current charges are similar, and this weighs in favor of admitting WS’s testimony.” Also, the court held that “the events occurred approximately eight years apart, so they are not presumptively barred under the 10-year limitation contained in MCL 768.27b(4).” On balance, it found that “the temporal proximity factor weighs in favor of admitting WS’s testimony.” The court concluded that considering “the frequency of the other act, WS alleged that Hendges assaulted her once. The lack of frequency of the other act supports the exclusion of WS’s testimony.” It held that there “were also no intervening acts that would support the exclusion or inclusion of WS’s testimony.” As to “the reliability of the evidence, Hendges admitted the incident with WS had occurred. Admittedly, he claimed he did not know she was intoxicated. But he pleaded to one count of attempted gross indecency based on WS’s complaint. His testimony and conviction support the reliability of the evidence and the admission of WS’s testimony.” The court concluded that “the Watkins factors support the admission of WS’s testimony because its probative value was not outweighed by the danger of unfair prejudice.” Affirmed.