Interpretation of MCL 750.543m (making a terrorism threat); Consideration of MCL 750.543z; The constitutional-doubt canon; Consideration of whether it is appropriate to adopt a limiting construction of MCL 750.543m to remedy any remaining constitutional deficiency; Dismissal without prejudice while an application for leave to appeal was pending with the court

In an order in lieu of granting leave to appeal, the court vacated the Court of Appeals judgment (see eJournal # 83167 in the 2/14/25 edition for the published opinion) and remanded the case to that court for reconsideration. It did not express an opinion as to “whether MCL 750.543m violates constitutional free-speech protections by imposing criminal liability without proof ‘that the defendant consciously disregarded a substantial risk that his communications would be viewed as threatening violence.’” It directed the Court of Appeals on remand to “address the proper interpretation of MCL 750.543m in light of: (1) MCL 750.543z, which provides that ‘a prosecuting agency shall not prosecute any person or seize any property for conduct presumptively protected by the’” First Amendment of the U.S. Constitution “‘in a manner that violates any constitutional provision’; and (2) the constitutional-doubt canon[.]” In addition, it is to “address: (3) whether it is appropriate to adopt a limiting construction of MCL 750.543m to remedy any remaining constitutional deficiency, . . . (4) if so, what that limiting construction should be; and (5) whether the [trial court] abused its discretion by dismissing the case without prejudice on” the date that it did “where doing so necessarily implicated ‘aspects of the case involved in the interlocutory appeal’ while an application for leave to appeal remained pending with” the court.