Action by a state prisoner under the Religious Land Use & Institutionalized Persons Act (RLUIPA), the Free Exercise Clause, & 42 USC § 1983; Whether the court had jurisdiction to consider plaintiff’s claims against defendants-prison chaplain & warden; Whether the RLUIPA authorized money damages against the prison officials; Redressability; Mootness; Haight v Thompson; Tanzin v Tanvir; Whether plaintiff could support a RLUIPA claim for injunctive relief against defendant-activities coordinator

[This appeal was from the WD-MI.] The court joined other circuits by holding that the RLUIPA does not authorize a claim for money damages against officials in their individual or official capacities. It also dismissed plaintiff-Ali’s claims for injunctive relief where he could obtain relief by signing up for the available vegan meal plan or an alternative plan. He also did not plead a cognizable RLUIPA claim against defendant-MDOC or a cognizable money-damages claim against two of the prison officials under the Free Exercise Clause and § 1983. Ali, a Muslim and a state prisoner, sued the prison warden, chaplain, activities coordinator, and the MDOC under the RLUIPA, the Free Exercise Clause, and § 1983, for failing to supply him with a halal diet. He also must “avoid certain foods, like pork, and meats slaughtered in a manner inconsistent with Islamic law.” Ali went through the steps he believed were necessary to obtain his alternative menu, including first applying for vegan meals, but his request was denied where the activities coordinator learned that Ali had purchased pork at the prison commissary. The district court dismissed the claims against the MDOC and granted the other defendants summary judgment. The court first held that it lacked jurisdiction to review the claims for injunctive relief against the warden and chaplain where “relief will not redress his injury. Only the special activities coordinator may approve requests for vegan meals. And only a ‘Deputy Director’ may approve requests for alternative menus, such as those containing halal meat.” Additionally, Ali is no longer in the same facility, so this claim against those two defendants was moot. And the special activities coordinator no longer works for MDOC. The court next concluded that the RLUIPA does not authorize a money-damages claim against the officials in their official or individual capacities. Along with its sister circuits, it held that “RLUIPA’s spending power underpinnings convey a narrower scope to ‘appropriate relief’ that excludes damages, given Congress’s failure to say otherwise unambiguously.” It also held that Ali failed to state a claim for relief under the RLUIPA against the MDOC because he did “not identify a policy that violates RLUIPA.” As to his claim for injunctive relief, the fact that he had “not re-applied for a vegan meal in seven years—despite this ready alternative to eating cross-contaminated food—undermines his request for relief from this court.” Finally, as to his money-damages claim against the chaplain and the activities coordinator under the Free Exercise Clause and § 1983, they were entitled to qualified immunity because he could not show they violated his clearly established rights. The court dismissed his appeal in part for lack of jurisdiction and affirmed the rest of the district court’s decision.