Whether the exclusion of a threat against defendant was outcome-determinative under People v Lukity; Self-defense; Jury instructions regarding the threat

The court concluded “that the Court of Appeals majority erred by holding that the trial court’s ruling was not outcome-determinative under Lukity. The threat” excluded by the trial court “was central to defendant’s self-defense theory.” Thus, it reversed the judgment of the Court of Appeals and remanded the case to the trial court for a new trial. The issue was “whether the trial court’s failure to admit defendant’s testimony that her partner threatened to kill her was more probably than not an outcome determinative error under” Lukity. Central to her “self-defense theory was the reason she retrieved a firearm.” The court held that “the trial court erroneously interrupted defendant’s testimony and sustained the prosecution’s objection that such a statement was improper hearsay. Defendant later made the statement on recross-examination. However, the trial court provided jury instructions that likely left the jury confused on whether they could consider this testimony.” The court concluded “that the trial court’s failure to allow defendant to present this testimony about her self-defense theory, coupled with the jury’s likely confusion regarding whether it could consider the statement at all, amount to errors that more probably than not were outcome-determinative under Lukity that require reversal.”

Justice Cavanagh fully concurred in the court’s decision to remand this case for a new trial, but wrote “separately to emphasize a concern that has previously been raised, but not directly addressed” by the court: “whether [our] interpretation of the standard of review for preserved, nonconstitutional errors under MCL 769.26 that we announced in” Lukity “should be revisited given its apparent inconsistency with the standard of review for ineffective assistance of counsel under Strickland v Washington.”

Dissenting, Justice Zahra and Chief Justice Clement agreed “that the trial court erred by excluding defendant’s testimony regarding her partner’s alleged threat as hearsay on direct examination.” The prosecution conceded this error. They nonetheless disagreed with the majority’s “decision to reverse the judgment of the Court of Appeals and remand the case for a new trial. A new trial is not warranted because it is not more probable than not that this error was outcome-determinative under MCL 769.26 and” Lukity.