Civil or criminal contempt; Criminal sanctions; Fine-imposing authority under MCL 600.1715; Compensatory damages to a party injured by contempt; Birkenshaw v Detroit; Divesting appellant of his interest in the estate; “Interested persons”; MCL 700.1105(c); Indirect contempt; Procedural defects

The court “held that the trial court’s corrected second contempt order is largely a determination of what the estate was already entitled to under the settlement agreement and a grant of compensatory damages in accordance with that entitlement. But the provisions of the order divesting appellant of his interest in the estate was a punitive sanction that triggered [his] due-process rights. The trial court’s failure to provide [him] with due-process safeguards in this respect was in error.” Thus, the court vacated the portions of the corrected contempt order imposing criminal sanctions “removing appellant as an interested person and precluding him from receiving any further distributions from the estate, but” affirmed in all other respects. As to whether the trial court held appellant in civil or criminal contempt, its “first contempt order was civil in nature. It was attempting to compel appellant to comply with the trial court’s prior orders.” The court found that the “corrected second order of contempt, on the other hand, imposed both civil and criminal contempt sanctions. Most of the provisions in the corrected second contempt order imposed damages for his breach of the settlement agreement by ordering appellant to pay the estate that to which it was entitled under the agreement. But two provisions—those which effectively divested appellant of his interest in the estate—were punitive in nature, and thus constitute criminal contempt.” As to the civil contempt provisions, he argued “that the trial court abused its discretion by imposing monetary sanctions more than $7,500.” This argument mischaracterized the “order as being purely a contempt fine. Subparagraphs A-D of the corrected second contempt order concern money to which the Estate was entitled under the settlement agreement. Similarly, Subparagraph F is not a contempt fine because it concerns the taxable costs this Court awarded the estate in the prior appeal.” The court noted that “the only paragraph imposing a contempt fine is subparagraph E, which awards $7,500. Accordingly, the trial court did not exceed its fine-imposing authority under MCL 600.1715.” Appellant also argued that the “order was ‘clearly punitive and prohibited as a matter of law[,]’ but concedes that a trial court has the authority to order compensatory damages to a party injured by contempt[.]” The court disagreed with his claim “that the trial court’s reference to appellant’s noncompliance with its prior orders indicates that it intended to impose punitive damages. At most, this reference indicates that the trial court’s findings and determination that [he] was in contempt of court. As for the alleged specific reference to [his] prior appeal, appellant contends this ‘obviously raise[s] concerns [that] the trial court held bias against’ him, but we disagree.” However, it concluded that “the trial court’s contempt order effectively divested appellant of his statutorily-defined interest.” It found that he “was entitled to a hearing before the trial court could impose the interest-divesting sanctions.”