Motion for a new trial; Failure to disclose a known res gestae witness; MCL 767.40a; Denial of an adjournment to allow further investigation; Sentencing; Upward departure from the guidelines; People v Steanhouse; People v Dixon-Bey; Operating a vehicle while intoxicated (OWI); Blood-alcohol content (BAC)

The court held that defendant did not show that “the failure to identify and present” a purported res gestae witness (witness-N’s fiancée) affected his trial’s outcome. Thus, he failed to establish “the requisite prejudice for reversal to be warranted based on a violation of MCL 767.40a.” It also rejected his challenge to his departure sentence. He was convicted of two counts of OWI causing death and sentenced as a third-offense habitual offender to concurrent terms of 20 to 30 years. The court noted that “there was extensive evidence presented at trial concerning the events that occurred before the accident. [N] testified as to his observations, including that defendant was traveling at a high rate of speed. The accident reconstructionist testified about the speed and position of each vehicle five seconds before impact. He opined that the Impala had already begun the process of entering the intersection five seconds before the crash, while defendant—who was traveling at 115 miles an hour—would have been 842.9 feet away, a length of just under three football fields. Both [N] and the reconstructionist believed that if defendant was traveling at the speed limit of 55 miles an hour, then the Impala would have cleared the intersection. The accident reconstructionist testified that it would have been difficult for someone in the [decedents’] position to gauge the speed of a vehicle approaching from the distance and direction at which defendant’s vehicle approached the intersection. Moreover, according to MCL 257.649(7), ‘[t]he driver of a vehicle traveling at an unlawful speed forfeits a right of way that the driver might otherwise have under’” the statute. There was also testimony about “the damage to the vehicles and the injuries suffered by” their occupants. Given this evidence, it was “unclear how further testimony about observations of the [decedents’] vehicle driving into the intersection,” the testimony defendant claimed N’s fiancée could have been provided, “would have had any effect on the jury’s verdict.” As to the trial court’s upward departure from the guidelines range of 62 to 171 months, it “referenced the extreme nature of the injuries the decedents suffered at the time of death, the extremely excessive speed at which defendant was driving, [his] extremely high [BAC], and the fact that [he] was on probation for a drunk driving offense at the time . . . .” He did not show the trial court abused its discretion. Affirmed.