Termination under §§ 19b(3)(c)(i) & (j); Child’s best interests; Reasonable reunification efforts

Concluding that: (1) §§ (c)(i) and (j) existed, (2) the trial court properly found that termination of respondent-mother’s parental rights was in BE’s best interest, and (3) her assertion that the DHHS failed to make reasonable efforts toward reunification as to KE lacked merit, the court affirmed. As to BE, the court held that because ‘“the totality of the evidence amply support[ed]’ a finding that respondent had not achieved ‘any meaningful change’ in the conditions that led to the trial court assuming jurisdiction over BE,” the trial court did not clearly err by holding “that clear and convincing evidence supported the termination of respondent’s parental rights under” § (c)(i). It also held the trial court “did not clearly err by finding that clear and convincing evidence supported the termination of” her parental rights under § (j). The evidence showed that she “admitted her substance abuse impaired her ability to safely parent BE, that she nonetheless continued to abuse substances and failed to participate in her treatment plan designed to address that abuse until [11/23], and that she missed a significant number of drug screens that her service plan required her to take. Considering this evidence and respondent’s history of sobriety for brief periods, followed by relapses, we see no clear error in the trial court’s conclusion that there existed a reasonable likelihood of harm to BE if he was returned to” her care. Also, the trial court terminated her parental rights to BE under § (i). “Respondent’s parental rights to BE’s older half-siblings, AE and EE, were terminated after respondent failed to comply with guardianship agreements that had been reached regarding those children.” However, in 7/24, the court reversed the order terminating her “parental rights to AE and EE on the basis that clear and convincing evidence did not show that respondent failed to substantially comply with a support order for a period of 2 years or more.” The record showed that she “failed to substantially comply with a support order for only 22 or 23 months rather than 24 months as the statute required.” Because the court “reversed the order terminating respondent’s parental rights to AE and EE, the trial court’s order terminating respondent’s parental rights to BE is erroneous to the extent that the court relied on” § (i) in doing so. Reversal was “not required, however, because only one statutory ground must be established to terminate parental rights.” Also, on “this record, the trial court did not clearly err when it found that termination of respondent’s parental rights was in BE’s best interests. Despite being provided a multitude of services, respondent was not in a position to safely and consistently parent her son. Continuing a parent-child relationship would have been detrimental to BE’s physical, educational, and emotional well-being.” The trial “court properly weighed the appropriate factors when considering BE’s best interests, and a preponderance of the evidence supported terminating respondent’s parental rights.” Finally, the court found that after “reviewing the record, it is readily apparent that the DHHS made reasonable efforts to reunify respondent with KE and that termination of respondent’s parental rights resulted from her failure to participate in and benefit from services rather than from the adequacy of the DHHS’s efforts.”