42 USC § 1983 action as to a wrongful conviction; Whether the court had jurisdiction to review defendant’s claim that Heck v Humphrey prevented review of plaintiff’s vacated conviction; Chaney-Snell v Young; Whether the court had jurisdiction to review the denial of qualified immunity on the Brady v Maryland claim; Clark v Louisville-Jefferson Cnty Metro Gov’t; Collateral estoppel; Peterson v Heymes; Qualified immunity on the “suggestive identification” claim

[This appeal was from the ED-MI.] The court held that it lacked jurisdiction to review defendant-Detective Olsen’s claim that plaintiff-Salter’s conviction was not properly vacated under Heck. Further, to the extent it had jurisdiction over his challenge to Salter’s Brady claim, the court rejected it. Finally, it held that he “was not entitled to qualified immunity on Salter’s suggestive identification claim.” Salter wrongfully served 15 years in prison for a shooting. He brought this civil rights case against defendant-City and the lead investigator on the criminal case, Olsen, for violating his constitutional rights by withholding exculpatory evidence under Brady, and by conducting a photo identification with the only witness that was unduly suggestive. The district court denied Olsen’s motion for summary judgment based on qualified immunity. On appeal, the court first addressed the issue of jurisdiction, holding that it did not have interlocutory jurisdiction over several aspects of Olsen’s appeal. As to his claim that Salter’s conviction was not properly vacated under Heck, in Chaney-Snell the court held that it lacked jurisdiction to review a Heck challenge from a denial of qualified immunity on a § 1983 claim on interlocutory appeal. Olsen also argued he was improperly denied qualified immunity on Salter’s claims that his rights were violated by Olsen’s failure to turn over evidence implicating another individual, in violation of Brady, and by using only a single-photo show-up during the investigation. The court held that it also largely lacked jurisdiction to review his arguments as to the Brady claim where there were mixed questions of law and fact. It noted that in Clark, it “recently clarified that, in the Brady context, we lack jurisdiction to consider such mixed questions in an interlocutory qualified immunity appeal.” However, to the extent that it could have jurisdiction, it allowed the claim to go to the jury. As to Olsen’s collateral estoppel argument, based on the fact that the state court in the criminal case had found that the show-up was not impermissibly suggestive, the court held that Michigan law provides that “a vacated criminal conviction and the interlocutory rulings supporting it have no preclusive effect[,]” even if it is vacated by stipulation. As for the due process claim regarding the “unnecessarily suggestive” identification procedure, the court held that “[b]ased on binding precedent, a reasonable officer would have known the single-person show-up would not produce a reliable identification[,]” and thus Olsen was not entitled to qualified immunity on this claim. Affirmed in part and dismissed in part for lack of jurisdiction.