Assumption of jurisdiction over the children; MCL 712A.2(b)(1) & (2); Termination under §§ 19b(3)(b)(i), (b)(ii) & (j); Children’s best interests; In re White; Effect of a relative placement; In re Olive/Metts

The court held that there was sufficient evidence for the jury to find a statutory basis for the trial court to assume jurisdiction over respondent-mother’s children (CM and JT) under MCL 712A.2(b)(1) and (2). And while it erred in finding that termination was warranted under § (b)(i), it did not err in finding that §§ (b)(ii) and (j) were established by clear and convincing evidence. But the court vacated its best-interests determination and remanded because the trial “court failed to consider the children’s best interests in light of their relative placement.” Ample record evidence supported “the jury’s verdict and the trial court’s assumption of jurisdiction under MCL 712A.2(b)(1) and (2), specifically, that respondent failed to provide proper care and the home was unfit.” She conceded that her live-in boyfriend (T) “sexually abused CM on more than one occasion. Even without this concession, the testimony overwhelmingly supported this finding.” Further, there was sufficient evidence for the jury to conclude that she “failed to protect JT and CM from [T’s] physical abuse.” As to termination, the “most compelling evidence that respondent would be unwilling or unable to protect her children from known risks of harm in the future was her continued insistence, despite compelling evidence to the contrary, that she did nothing wrong. In addition, [her] serious past failure to protect [them] showed a concerning lack of insight, awareness, or judgment necessary to protect a child from harm. Further, there was testimony that [her] cognitive deficits, mental health issues, and lack of suitable housing would preclude her from safely parenting” them. But as to their best interests, the trial court did not “explicitly address the children’s relative placement as required by” Olive/Metts. Failing to do so rendered “the factual record inadequate to make a best-interest determination” and made remand necessary. The DHHS contended that “because the children were similarly situated despite their age gap, the trial court was not required to address the fact that [they] were placed with relatives. This” was incorrect and unsupported by legal authority. However, contrary to respondent’s claim, the trial court did not have “to address each child’s best interests separately.” Affirmed in part, vacated and remanded in part.