Divorce; Child custody; The statutory best-interest factors (MCL 722.23); Factors (d), (e), & (f); Fletcher v Fletcher; Property division; Sparks v Sparks; Spousal support; Woodington v Shokoohi; Whether the trial court essentially impermissibly divided Veterans Administration (VA)-disability benefits as marital property; Applicability of the Uniformed Services Former Spouses’ Protection Act; 10 USC § 1408; Mansell v Mansell; The anti-attachment clause (38 USC § 5301(a)(1)); Rose v Rose

The court held that the trial court’s findings on best-interest factors (d) and (e) were not against the great weight of the evidence, and while it erred as to factor (f), this was harmless. It also rejected plaintiff-ex-husband’s challenges to the trial court’s division of the parties’ marital property and spousal support award to defendant-ex-wife. The trial court awarded defendant primary physical custody of the parties’ child (E), the marital home, two of their “vehicles, her personal checking and savings account, her personal retirement accounts, and half of plaintiff’s military pension that accumulated during the” marriage. Defendant was made “responsible for the marital property’s mortgage and her student loan debt. The trial court also awarded [her] $1,500 a month in spousal support for eight years.” As to E’s custody, the court concluded that the trial court correctly found factor (d) “favored defendant because [she] planned to stay in [E’s] current home, while plaintiff’s new home would disrupt the continuity of [E’s] living arrangement.” While the trial court made a clear error on factor (e) as to the location of an apartment plaintiff kept, it “did not ultimately abuse its discretion in concluding this factor favored defendant. Plaintiff testified that he had an over two-hour commute to his employment” in either direction. The trial court’s ruling on this factor was based on its conclusion that his “four-hour daily commute and his work hours would make it difficult for [him] to maintain permanency in his new home.” As to factor (f), the record showed “that plaintiff was a loving and appropriate father.” Defendant testified that he “had a good relationship with [E] and that she had no concerns about her in his care.” But while the trial court abused its discretion in finding that this factor favored defendant, its custody decision was based on its findings that factors (d), (e), (f), and (h) favored her “and all other factors were either equal or inapplicable.” Plaintiff did not challenge its finding on factor (h). As to the property division, there was no doubt it “favored defendant over plaintiff[,]” but the court was not convinced it “was inequitable in light of the facts[,]” including the parties’ income disparities and plaintiff’s hiding marital assets from defendant. As to the spousal support award, among other things it concluded that “the trial court did not err in considering plaintiff’s VA-disability funds . . . .” Affirmed.