Probable cause to issue a search warrant; Admission of blood-test results without testimony from the phlebotomist who conducted the blood draw; Exclusion of expert witness testimony about ketoacidosis; Jury instructions; Opportunity for questions or objections on the record before the instructions were read; Exclusion of M Crim JI 15.5(1); Inclusion of M Crim JI 4.16; Proximate cause instruction; Sentencing; Scoring of 20 points for OV 18; Presumption required by MCL 769.34; Imposing jail time; Cumulative effect of alleged errors

The court held “that a reasonably cautious person could have concluded that the affidavit provided a substantial basis for the finding of probable cause in this case.” Also, it found that while “the phlebotomist did not testify at trial, the testimony admitted at trial was sufficient to ensure that the blood tested was defendant’s and that the sample was reliable.” Further, the trial court “did not prohibit defendant from presenting his own witness or establishing a defense” regarding ketoacidosis. The court also found that any error related to the jury instructions was harmless and rejected his sentencing challenges. He was convicted of OWI causing serious impairment and sentenced to 45 days in jail and 3 years of probation. As to the issue of probable cause for a search warrant, the court noted that “the officer explained the following reasons for believing that defendant was under the influence: (1) that defendant smelled strongly of intoxicants, and (2) that [he] hit a stopped vehicle at a rate of speed fast enough to leave the other vehicle overturned roughly 50 yards away from the intersection.” The court held “that the strong odor of intoxicants, combined with the physical facts of the collision, could have led a reasonably cautious person to have concluded that there was a substantial basis for the finding of probable cause” here. Defendant specifically argued “that because diabetes can explain both the accident and the odor of intoxicants, there was not enough information in the affidavit to allow a reasonable person to find probable cause. But, the magistrate was responsible for making ‘a practical, common-sense decision whether, given all the circumstances set forth in the affidavit before him, including the “veracity” and “basis of knowledge” of persons supplying hearsay information, there is a fair probability that contraband or evidence of a crime will be found in a particular place.’” The court concluded that because “the information in the affidavit could have led a reasonably cautious person to conclude that there was a fair probability that defendant was operating under the influence—regardless of whether the information could have also led a reasonably cautious person to conclude that there was a fair probability that [he] was suffering from a health complication—the magistrate did not err.” Affirmed.