Divorce; Custody; The Child Custody Act; Existence of an established custodial environment (ECE); MCL 722.27(1)(c); Child’s best interests; The MCL 722.23 factors; Factors (k), (c), & (h); Parenting-time factor (e) (MCL 722.27a(7)(e)); Review of a trial court’s order in a custody dispute; MCL 722.28; Child support; The Michigan Child Support Formula

The court held that the trial court did not err in finding the parties’ child (KD) had an ECE “with both parents and that it was in KD’s best interests for” them to share joint legal and physical custody with equal parenting time. It also rejected plaintiff-mother’s claim that the trial court erred in not awarding her back child support or ordering defendant-father to reimburse her for payments she made for his travel expenses that enabled him to exercise parenting time with KD. Thus, the court affirmed the trial court’s orders as to custody, parenting time, and child support. It first disagreed “with plaintiff’s claim that the trial court’s findings on” the child’s ECE were against the great weight of the evidence. She emphasized that the child “spent 21 months living in Houston” while the case was pending. But while she “had more time with KD in Texas because defendant lived in Michigan, defendant flew to Texas to visit KD every other weekend as allowed by the trial court’s parenting-time order, and he also had video calls with KD twice a week.” The court concluded “ample evidence showed that KD looked to both plaintiff and defendant for guidance, discipline, the necessities of life, and parental comfort. . . . Although KD saw defendant less often, she spent time with him regularly, looked at him as her father, and enjoyed her time with him. Evidence also showed that [he] was committed to forging a permanent relationship with KD through his dedicated efforts to visit KD despite having to travel by plane to do so.” The court also disagreed with plaintiff’s assertion that “the trial court’s best-interest and parenting-time findings were against the great weight of the evidence.” As to best-interest factor (k), “the trial court had the discretion to accept defendant’s explanation of the incidents cited by plaintiff[.]” In addition, “the evidence did not clearly preponderate against the trial court’s conclusion that defendant had the capacity and disposition to provide medical care to KD under MCL 722.23(c).” And while plaintiff contended it “should have given greater consideration to best-interest factor (h)” and parenting-time factor (e), “the evidence did not preponderate against the trial court’s fact findings, and expert testimony established that children can adapt well to scheduled travel to spend time with both parents.” Thus, the court found that plaintiff was “not entitled to relief on this issue.”