Governmental immunity; Gross negligence; MCL 691.1407(8)(a); The motor vehicle exception; MCL 691.1405; Serious impairment of body function; Sudden emergency doctrine; Proximate cause; Comparative negligence; MCL 500.3135(2)(b); Swartz Creek Community Schools (SCCS); Independent medical exam (IME)

The court concluded that the trial court erred in denying summary disposition to defendant-Richards under MCR 2.116(C)(7), but affirmed its denial of summary disposition to defendant-SCCS under (C)(7) and (10), and remanded for further proceedings solely against SCCS. Richards was driving a truck owned by SCCS when it collided with plaintiff’s vehicle. As to gross negligence, the court found that the “evidence viewed in the light most favorable to plaintiff, shows there was little, if any, snow on that section of Miller Road. Reasonable minds could not find that the condition of Miller Road at the time of the collision was so treacherous that Richards’s driving just under the speed limit amounted to ‘conduct so reckless as to demonstrate a substantial lack of concern for whether an injury results.’” Thus, the court held that Richards should have been granted summary disposition under MCL 2.116(C)(7). As to the motor vehicle exception to governmental immunity, defendants insisted “that plaintiff failed to establish that, as a result of the accident, he suffered a” serious impairment of body function. The court held that the IME “merely reflects conflicts among the medical records plaintiff offered, and such conflict renders the award of summary disposition inappropriate.” The medical records showed “consistent complaints of left-shoulder pain with the first documented complaint made within three days of the collision, and aside from” the opinion of the doctor who performed an IME, “nothing in the records suggests that plaintiff had a pre-existing left-shoulder injury or suffered such an injury after the collision. Therefore, at the very least, those records establish a genuine issue of fact whether [his] left-shoulder injury was caused by the collision.” The court further held that there was “a genuine issue of material fact whether there was a sudden emergency—i.e., whether the movement of the black truck, or lack thereof, constituted a sudden emergency—and whether Richards’s reaction to ‘jam[] on the breaks,’ which caused him to lose control of his vehicle, was that of a reasonably prudent person. Resolution of those issues likely hinges on minor details” and the record did “not sufficiently establish those details in a manner that would enable the trial court to decide” the question as a matter of law. And there was “a genuine issue of material fact whether Richards was negligent in driving just under the speed limit given the road conditions, and whether that purported negligence brought about the sudden emergency.” In addition, his negligence could “be a proximate cause of the crash if it was a substantial factor in bringing” it about. The trial court correctly denied summary disposition on this issue. It also “did not err when it left the determination of comparative negligence to the trier of fact.”