Trespass; Dalley v Dykema Gossett PLLC; Intent; Wolfenbarger v Wright; Materiality; Reasonableness of mistake; Negligence; Kandil-Elsayed v F & E Oil, Inc; Duty; Breach; Noneconomic damages for property damage; Price v High Pointe Oil Co

The court held that the trial court did not err by granting plaintiff summary disposition of her trespass and negligence claims against defendants-lawn care service and technician (Poellnitz), but did err by awarding her noneconomic damages. Plaintiff sued defendants after Poellnitz mistakenly went to her address and sprayed chemicals on her organic clover lawn, garden, and plants, damaging them. The trial court granted her summary disposition as to liability and scheduled a trial on damages. The jury awarded her $22,400 in economic damages and $66,150 in noneconomic damages. The trial court then denied defendants’ motion for JNOV and remittitur. On appeal, the court rejected their argument that the trial court erred when it granted plaintiff’s motion as to liability. “Although Poellnitz may have been mistaken about which property he needed to service, there is no dispute [he] intended to enter onto plaintiff’s property.” As such, “the trial court did not err in ruling that there was no genuine issue of material fact as to defendants’ liability on plaintiff’s trespass claim.” The court also found that the trial court did not err when it awarded plaintiff partial summary disposition as to liability on her negligence claim. “In arguing that the trial court erred by resolving the question of reasonableness, defendants do not cite any evidence that gives rise to a genuine issue of material fact as to the reasonableness of Poellnitz’s conduct.” And given the “relatively simple act it would have taken for [him] to confirm the address and avoid the improper application of chemicals, defendants’ conduct was not reasonable, so [they] breached the duty of care owed to plaintiff.” But the court agreed with defendants that the trial court erred by allowing the jury to award plaintiff noneconomic damages. It “abused its discretion by ruling that plaintiff would be permitted ‘to present testimony relating to her non-economic damages, e.g., mental anguish, etc.’ That ruling enabled [her] to present evidence of mental anguish for property destruction, which is improper under” Price. She could not “recover noneconomic damages for harm to her property” despite the fact “she successfully asserted a trespass claim in addition to a negligence claim.” The reasons given by the “Supreme Court for prohibiting noneconomic damages in Price apply with equal force here.” In so ruling, the court recognized the “logical inconsistency” in the law, noting it “makes little sense to permit noneconomic damages in cases involving trespass-nuisance claims based on the mental anguish associated with deprivation of the use and enjoyment of property, but to bar [them] in cases where the property is negligently damaged or destroyed.” But the Supreme Court was clear on this issue. Affirmed in part, reversed in part, and remanded.