§ 19b(3)(j); Child’s best interests; Guardianship

Concluding that the trial court made sufficient factual findings as to termination under § (j) and that termination of respondent-mother’s parental rights was in the child’s (SJ) best interests, the court affirmed. “At the adjudication, the trial court found that respondent was a victim of her stepfather’s sexual abuse when she was a minor, was aware of her stepfather’s prior CSC conviction arising out of the abuse of his seven-year-old stepson, and had received warnings from CPS about her duty to protect SJ from her stepfather.” The trial court “found that respondent had created safety plans with CPS in which she was not to leave SJ unsupervised with her stepfather, but respondent failed to follow those plans and left SJ with her stepfather unsupervised despite her knowledge of his history and her suspicions that he had been sexually abusing SJ for several years.” It also found that she “struggled with her mental health and struggled to care for her children as a result, noting respondent’s testimony that she relied on SJ to help care for her other child.” The trial court further found that “respondent struggled to maintain her home during her depressive episodes, and . . . that [she] had previously struggled with financial and housing insecurity. In addition to its factual findings made at the adjudication, the trial court articulated other factual findings at the initial disposition.” It noted that respondent “continued to rely on and engage with her family and it found that respondent’s limited participation in services had not benefited her.” It also found “there was a history of domestic violence in respondent’s family household, noting an instance in which [her] brother pointed a shotgun at her.” It further found that she “had not remediated her mental-health issues that caused her to make decisions resulting in SJ’s abuse, and it found that the evidence did not suggest that respondent would make better decisions moving forward regarding SJ’s care.” The totality of the evidence amply supported “that there was a reasonable likelihood that SJ would be harmed if returned to respondent’s care based on respondent’s conduct.” Thus, the court was “not left with a definite and firm conviction that the trial court clearly erred by terminating respondent’s parental rights under” § (j). Also, her “argument that the trial court erred by failing to consider a guardianship for SJ” was without merit.