Discovery; Recording of the victim’s police interview; Evidence related to defendant’s prior CSC III conviction; MCL 768.27b; Unfair prejudice; MRE 403; Sentencing; Scoring of OVs 3, 4, & 10; The Sex Offenders Registration Act’s (SORA) requirements; Amended felony information

The court held that the “trial court did not err by declining to sanction the prosecution for its incidental discovery violation because the prosecution acted in good faith and because defendant received the relevant materials well in advance of trial.” It also did not err in admitting evidence about his prior CSC III “conviction because the evidence was authorized by statute and did not cause any unfair prejudice.” Further, the “sentencing guidelines were properly scored, and the trial court did not engage in any fact-finding when it ordered SORA registration.” Finally, there “were no defects with the habitual offender notice in defendant’s information.” He was convicted of CSC III and sentenced to 120 to 180 months. He argued “that a discovery violation warranting reversal occurred when he was not provided the recording of” an officer’s interview of the victim. The court found that the “evidence established that the prosecution made a good-faith attempt to mail the relevant material within the required timeframe, but the material was returned due to insufficient postage. While the flash drive that ultimately did make it to the prison was not usable, there is nothing in the record suggesting that this was intentional. Further, defendant still obtained the material months in advance of trial. Therefore, the trial court did not abuse its discretion by declining to sanction the prosecution.” Further, he did not even suggest “on appeal that his defense was impacted by the delayed discovery.” Defendant also asserted that the trial court should not have allowed his police interview from his prior CSC III “case to be played for the jury.” His argument mainly focused “on his contention that this was character evidence that painted him as a serial rapist. However, the Legislature specifically exempted this category of character evidence from the general prohibition when it enacted MCL 768.27b, so categorizing the interrogation video as character evidence does not impact its admissibility.” Defendant conceded that the “evidence was admitted pursuant to MCL 768.27b but” emphasized it was “subject to MRE 403. This limitation notwithstanding,” he did not attempt “to distinguish the prior offense from the current one such that the evidence of it would result in unfair prejudice.” He further argued “that the video should have been excluded because it made him look like a liar. However, the Legislature has allowed admission of this sort of evidence ‘for any purpose for which it is relevant,’” and evidence relating to a party’s credibility “‘is always relevant.’” The prosecution’s theory “was that defendant lied to the police about a sexual assault, so evidence that [he] previously lied to the police about a sexual assault was an incredibly probative attack against his credibility.” Thus, the court held that “the trial court did not abuse its discretion by admitting the video of defendant’s interrogation from his prior” CSC III conviction. Affirmed.