Sentencing; Reasonableness & proportionality; People v Posey; Departure sentence; People v Dixon-Bey; Principle that “the more egregious the offense, and the more recidivist the criminal, the greater the punishment”; People v Babcock; Accuracy of the PSIR; MCR 6.425(E)(2); People v Grant; Waiver; Scoring of OV 8; MCL 777.38(1); Scoring of OV 14; MCL 777.44(1)(a); “Multiple-offender situation”; People v Dickinson; Ministerial correction of the PSIR; Constitutionality of MCL 769.1k(1)(b)(iii)

The court held that defendant’s sentence was proportional and that the trial court did not err in relying on the PSIR in scoring the OVs. However, it remanded for the ministerial task of correcting his score as to OV 13. He was convicted of a variety of charges arising out of his sexual abuse of the young victim and his Internet searches related to young girls. The trial court sentenced him accordingly. On appeal, the court rejected his argument that the trial court imposed a grossly disproportionate sentence that exceeded the minimum guidelines by 100 months. “Ultimately, the trial court’s reasons form a mix of factors not considered, or not adequately considered, by the sentencing guidelines, as well as a balance of society’s need for protection against defendant’s potential for rehabilitation.” The court also rejected his claim that because certain facts in the PSIR were incorrect, the trial court imposed a sentence greater than it otherwise would have. “Contrary to defendant’s argument at his resentencing . . . the police report demonstrate[d] that there were two instances of sexual assault—once in the bathroom and again on the bed. Defendant did not support his challenge; therefore, the challenge was not effective, and the trial court’s determination to rely instead on the PSIR was not an outcome that was outside the range of reasonable and principled outcomes.” In addition, a “preponderance of the evidence supported that defendant was a leader in a multiple-offender situation and that the trial court correctly assessed 10 points for OV 14.” Also, the trial court’s scoring error as to OV 13 “did not affect defendant’s minimum sentencing guidelines range” and resentencing was not required. Nevertheless, it remanded “for the limited ministerial task of correcting the score for OV 13 in the sentencing information report.” Finally, the court rejected his contention that MCL 769.1k(1)(b)(iii) is “facially unconstitutional on the basis that it incentivizes judges to convict defendants and assess costs to fund their courts.” It noted that it “has already considered this issue and determined that the statute is not unconstitutional.” Affirmed.