Homeowner’s insurance coverage dispute; Whether the trial court relied on admissible evidence in ruling on a summary disposition motion; Hearsay; Latits v Phillips; Video footage; Statements from a police report; Intentional-acts policy exclusion; Insurance contract interpretation; Allstate Ins Co v McCarn (McCarn II); Allstate Ins Co v Keillor (On Remand); Distinguishing the policy at issue in McCarn II; Whether the policy was ambiguous

The court held that the trial court did not err in relying on surveillance video footage in ruling on plaintiff-insurer’s (Meemic) summary disposition motion and that any error in relying on hearsay-within-hearsay in a police report was harmless. It further concluded there was no genuine dispute of fact “that bodily injury could reasonably be expected from” defendant-insured’s (Metiva) act of placing a nonparty (M) “in a headlock and dragging him to the ground[.]” It found that the terms of the homeowner’s policy at issue were not ambiguous and precluded coverage here. Thus, it affirmed summary disposition for Meemic. When Metiva and M fell to the ground, they landed on defendant-Fitzgerald, injuring her, and she sued Metiva. Meemic then brought this action for declaratory relief, asserting among other things that “the incident fell within the policy’s intentional-acts exclusion.” On appeal, Fitzgerald asserted “that the trial court impermissibly relied on hearsay evidence” in the form of surveillance footage and a police report in reaching its decision on Meemic’s summary disposition motion. But the court noted that surveillance “video evidence is not hearsay because it is not a statement, and generally admissible assuming it is relevant, not otherwise prohibited by law, and is authenticated pursuant to MRE 901” The footage here “captured the altercation between Metiva and [M] without any audio, or any postincident interview footage with eye witnesses. Further, no party in this matter disputes the surveillance footage’s authenticity” and Metiva authenticated it. Further, because the footage supported the trial court’s descriptions of what occurred, and it “could have reached the same conclusion reviewing the surveillance footage alone, any error made in” relying on the police report was harmless. The court applied “an objective standard, not McCarn II’s subjective standard” in interpreting the policy contract and also noted that there was “a meaningful distinction between the policy in McCarn II and the policy at issue” here. The court agreed with the trial court that, “objectively, Metiva’s act of placing someone in a headlock and pulling them to the ground could reasonably be expected to cause bodily injury.” Thus, the trial court did not err in determining that the exemption in § (II)(1)(A) of the policy applied.