Motion to withdraw guilty plea; People v Spencer; Knowingly, voluntarily, or intelligently; People v Carmichael

The court affirmed the trial court’s denial of defendant’s motion to withdraw his plea. He pled guilty to possession of meth within 1,000 feet of school property, second or subsequent offense. Prior to sentencing, he “moved to withdraw his plea to this offense on the ground that it was not knowingly, voluntarily, and intelligently entered.” The trial court denied his motion. Defendant argued “that his plea was involuntary because he could not adequately consider it without his medication.” He claimed “that at the time of his plea, he experienced symptoms of shaking and confusion due to withdrawal from medications. However, unlike the defendant in Carmichael, the trial court found defendant exhibited no signs of withdrawal during the plea process—the transcript and video recording of the plea hearing support [its] findings.” In addition to his “claims concerning his experiences with withdrawals during his plea hearing, he assert[ed] that at the time of entering his plea, he had not received the police report or the factual allegations related to the charge of possession of [meth] within 1,000 feet of a school.” This claim suggested “that his plea was not made knowingly. Again, the record belie[d] defendant’s assertions. [He] was present during the execution of the search warrant at his residence and during his plea hearing acknowledged his possession of” meth. The record did “not support defendant’s statements in his appeal to the contrary. Therefore, the trial court’s conclusion that the plea was made knowingly did not constitute an abuse of discretion.” Further, he argued “that the prosecution failed to fulfill its obligation to demonstrate that substantial prejudice would result from the withdrawal of his plea. The prosecution contended that other cases had either been resolved or were ongoing with the understanding that the defendant’s plea was valid. Although this was articulated with limited coherence, the prosecution maintained that more than mere inconvenience was at stake, asserting that the plea withdrawal would impede the prosecution of other defendants, as noted in Spencer[.]” Thus, the court held that “the trial court did not abuse its discretion in denying defendant’s motion to withdraw his guilty plea.” He additionally argued “that the plea was unsupported by a sufficient factual basis because the record did not establish that he knew he was within 1,000 feet of a school when he possessed the” meth. The court held that the “trial court correctly observed that when inquired if he was within 1,000 feet of a school at the time of possessing [meth], the defendant responded affirmatively. Even assuming, for the sake of argument, that the trial court erred in this assertion, it is essential to note that the prosecution was not obligated to demonstrate that the defendant possessed knowledge of his proximity to a school within 1,000 feet.” The video and transcript of his “plea serve as compelling evidence that undermines all of defendant’s assertions that his pleas were not made knowingly, voluntarily, or intelligently.”