Employment-related claims; Shortened limitations period in the employment application; Timko v Oakwood Custom Coating, Inc; Clark v DaimlerChrysler Corp; Mutuality of agreement; Distinguishing McMillon v Kalamazoo; Electronic signature; The Uniform Electronic Transactions Act (UETA); MCL 450.832(h); Abandoned argument as to the effect of a claim filed with the Michigan Department of Civil Rights (MDCR); Public policy

The court held that under binding case law as it currently stands, the trial court properly granted defendant-former employer summary disposition of plaintiff’s employment-related claims based on a shortened limitations period contained in the employment application. Plaintiff first contended the trial court erred in ruling “that summary disposition was proper under Timko, when the application was filled out before defendant offered” him a job. The court noted the plaintiff in Clark also “signed the application before hire. That distinction itself is not determinative.” Plaintiff next asserted the trial court erred in determining there was mutuality of agreement to establish a contract. But as defendant argued, “plaintiff was hired for the job to which he applied, and, during that process, agreed to the clear term shortening the limitations period by completing his application.” That distinguished this case from McMillon, where “there was a genuine issue of material fact about whether the plaintiff would have known that the same application terms would apply[.]” There was no basis here “to find that plaintiff would question whether his application materials would apply to his employment when he was hired only one month after applying, and for the same job for which he applied. Accordingly, the trial court did not err by distinguishing this situation from that in McMillon.” Plaintiff also contended that a question of fact existed as to whether his “typing his name on the electronic application constituted a signature to create a contract.” But the court held that it did, noting he did “not dispute that he typed his name, agreeing to the conditions of the application. Under the UETA, this was a valid electronic signature.” He next contended “that he notified defendant of his claims by filing” a complaint with the MDCR three months after he was allegedly constructively discharged. The court found this argument was abandoned for failure to develop it, and added that regardless, his “complaint to the MDCR did not toll the contractually agreed-upon limitations period, and plaintiff did not sue defendant within six months of his discharge. The plain language of the contract required a lawsuit within six months.” Finally, he did not establish “that the trial court erred by finding that the clause did not violate public policy.” Affirmed.