Auto negligence; Service; Extension of a summons; Substitution of service when a party dies; MCR 2.202(A)(1); Principle that deceased persons cannot be sued; Comparing Potter v Devine (Unpub) & Packard v Thomas (Unpub); Principle that an action against a deceased person must be brought against the estate; Williams v Grossman; Personal representative (PR); Dismissal; MCR 2.202(A)(1)(b)

The court held that the trial court did not err by dismissing plaintiff’s action against the deceased defendants. The parties were involved in a car crash that resulted in serious injuries to plaintiff and the deaths of defendants. Plaintiff then filed this lawsuit against defendants. After attempting to serve them, he learned that they had died, a fact he claimed to be unaware of when he filed suit. The trial court granted his motion for extension of the summons to allow him to “set up” estates for them and/or serve their insurer. Ultimately, however, it stated its belief that plaintiff was aware that defendants were deceased and should have known that the only way service could be proper was on the estate. Because “there was no estate, there was no way that alternate service could be proper, as it could not ‘reasonably effectuate actual service on the proper defendant.’” And because the motion for alternative service was improper on its face, it should not have been granted. On appeal, plaintiff argued that the trial court misapplied MCR 2.202(A) by dismissing the case instead of allowing him to substitute the estates, and that it “shortened the statute of limitations ‘by implication’ when it dismissed” the case without giving him time to create the estates. Adopting the reasoning in Potter and Packard, the court held “that a deceased person like the named defendants here cannot be sued as a matter of law.” A party “wishing to bring a cause of action against someone who is deceased must sue the deceased’s persons estate, not the deceased person.” As such, the “trial court did not err by dismissing this action filed against the wrong parties, who could not be sued as a matter of law.” In addition, because “the named defendants in this case were already deceased when plaintiff filed his” action, MCR 2.202(A) did not apply, and even if it did “the ‘proper parties’ to replace the deceased defendants were their estates.” Further, no PR “had been appointed for the named defendants’ estates when the trial court dismissed plaintiff’s complaint, so substituting in the proper parties at the time of dismissal was a legal impossibility.” The trial court “did not abuse its discretion by refusing to order the substitution of defendants . . . when there were no ‘proper parties’ who could be substituted for the deceased defendants.” Further, the fact it “was not required to dismiss this action does not establish that” it erred by doing so. Finally, plaintiff abandoned “his argument that a trial court errs by shortening a statute of limitations ‘by implication’” by failing to cite any supporting legal authority. In any event, the court found it meritless. Affirmed.