Other acts evidence; MRE 404(b)(1); Relevance; MRE 402; Unfair prejudice; MRE 403; The “180-day rule”; MCL 780.131(1); People v Witkoski; Speedy trial; The Barker test; Barker v Wingo; Speedy trial; Principle that pandemic-related delays should not be held against the prosecutor in evaluating speedy-trial claims; People v Smith; Jail credit; MCL 769.11b; Ineffective assistance of counsel; Failure to advance a meritless argument or raise a futile objection

The court held that: (1) defendant’s parole officer’s testimony was not unfairly prejudicial, (2) he was denied not denied his right to a speedy trial, and (3) he was not denied the effective assistance of counsel. He was convicted of felonious assault, larceny in a building, and domestic violence for assaulting the victim, his then-girlfriend, and then taking some of her belongings when he moved out. On appeal, the court rejected his argument that his parole officer’s testimony about her investigation into the victim’s allegations was improper other acts evidence. There was “no evidence in the record showing the testimony about defendant’s parole status was unfairly prejudicial.” The testimony “focused on the victim’s report and” the subsequent investigation. There “was no testimony about defendant’s prior convictions or the reason for his parole.” In addition, “defendant was acquitted of aggravated domestic violence,” which further lessened the likelihood he was prejudiced by the testimony. The court also rejected his claim that the trial court violated the 180-day rule, noting that because there was no evidence as to when the MDOC notified the prosecutor of defendant’s incarceration, and defendant presented none on appeal, it was “impossible to determine whether a violation of the 180-day rule actually occurred.” In addition, his “trial was not delayed because of the prosecutor’s unpreparedness; it was delayed by pandemic-related illness.” Further, he was not “entitled to jail credit because he was held on a parole detainer through the entirety of his pretrial detention.” Finally, the court rejected his contention that defense counsel was ineffective for failure to object to his parole officer’s testimony and for unfairly delaying trial. First, the trial court did not err in admitting this evidence and failing to “‘advance a meritless argument or raise a futile objection does not constitute ineffective assistance of counsel.’” Second, defense counsel stated she would not agree to the parole officer’s remote testimony, and “there were obvious strategic reasons for this demand.” Affirmed.