Attorney fees incurred after entry of arbitrators’ remedial order; MCL 691.1705; Distinguishing De Simone v Barberio (Unpub); Proving the reasonableness of the fees sought

The court disagreed with plaintiff-Gruber’s claim that he was contractually entitled to additional attorney fees and held that the trial court did not abuse its discretion in denying his motion for fees under MCL 691.1705. He sued defendants for wrongful termination. The matter went to arbitration. The arbitration panel ruled for “Gruber, leaving its determination of an appropriate remedy for a later date.” Proceedings in the trial court and the court followed. The court affirmed the trial court’s ruling upholding the arbitration award. The trial court remanded the case to the arbitration panel, which issued a remedial order and a memorandum. After further proceedings in the trial court and the court, Gruber unsuccessfully sought attorney fees incurred after the remedial order was issued. He contended that “he asserted his statutory and contractual rights to attorney fees, and the trial court should have followed the reasoning in De Simone[.]” He also argued that it “should have exercised its discretion under MCL 691.1705 to grant his requested attorney fees, especially because” the court had upheld the remedial order. The court noted that, unlike “De Simone, this case was not litigated by the courts because it was fully adjudicated before the arbitration panel.” Given that the cases were not similar, it was not persuaded that De Simone’s reasoning applied here. “Further, in this case, because the arbitration panel did follow §§ 9 and 10(G) of the parties’ employment contract, and recognized that Gruber was mainly, but not entirely, successful in the proceedings,” the court rejected his claim he was contractually entitled to the fees. As to his motion pursuant to MCL 691.1705, under the statute’s plain language, “it was within the trial court’s discretion to grant or deny Gruber attorney fees and costs that he incurred in moving to confirm the arbitration award, as well as any fees incurred in proceedings occurring after confirmation of the award.” To the extent he sought “fees that he incurred before raising his confirmation motion before the trial court, he was not entitled to those fees under the plain language of MCL 691.1705. To the extent Gruber sought attorney fees for bringing his motion for confirmation before the trial court and for subsequent proceedings, those fees were permitted under MCL 691.1705, but only at the trial court’s discretion, and the trial court found that [his] motion was cursory and unpersuasive. [It] did not clearly err in making this finding[.]” Affirmed.