Termination under § 19b(3)(j); Statutory grounds to exercise jurisdiction; MCL 712A.2(b)(2); The anticipatory-abuse doctrine; In re Kellogg; In re Powers; Children’s best interests; In re White; Due process; Consideration of a guardianship; In re Lombard; MCL 712A.19a(9); Plain error review

The court held that the trial court did not clearly err in “finding statutory bases to exercise jurisdiction over” respondent-father’s children under MCL 712A.2(b)(2) and to terminate his parental rights under § (j). It also did not clearly err in determining that termination was in their best interests or in failing to consider and rule out a guardianship as an alternative. The “trial court found that respondent repeatedly sexually abused” his teenaged niece (LL). Applying the anticipatory-abuse doctrine, it concluded that his “sexual abuse was probative of how he would treat his children.” On appeal, the court concluded that, contrary “to respondent’s contention, the anticipatory-abuse doctrine is not limited to instances in which a parent abuses a child over whom they have some degree of parental authority.” It also rejected his assertion that the probative value of his “sexual abuse was diminished by differences between LL and his children . . . .” The record showed that LL differed from his “children because she did not live in [his] home and was not [his] child. Yet, LL spent considerable time in respondent’s home and occasionally spent the night. She testified that [he] behaved inappropriately or sexually abused her nearly every time they were alone together. In light of the evidence that respondent repeatedly sexually abused his biological niece in the home where he lived with his children, the probative value of [his] sexual abuse was not negated by the fact that LL lived elsewhere or the fact that” she was not his child. Further, the fact that she is female and one of his children (J) “is male did not negate the probative value of respondent’s prior sexual abuse as it related to” J. The court further noted that “the trial court did not rely solely on the anticipatory-abuse doctrine. [It] also found that respondent’s sexual abuse of LL posed a risk of significant emotional harm to the children if [he] sexually abused one of their friends in the future.” As to their best interests, the record reflected “that respondent’s repeated sexual abuse of LL posed a significant risk of harm to the children. The trial court considered the extent to which [his] access to certain resources could alleviate the risk he posed to the children” and found that there were none “that could sufficiently benefit [him] given the heinous nature of his sexual abuse and failure to take responsibility for his actions. [It] also appropriately considered the children’s respective relative placements and nevertheless concluded that termination served their best interests.” Affirmed.