Sentencing; Imposition of a no-contact condition; People v Lafey

Holding that the trial court was not authorized to impose a no-contact condition on defendant, the court reversed and remanded for removal of that condition from her sentence. She pled guilty to aggravated child sexually abusive activity, CSC II, second-degree child abuse, surveilling an unclothed person, and CSC III, arising out of her enablement of and participation in the sexual assaults of her daughter and granddaughter. The trial court sentenced her to concurrent terms for each of the offenses and imposed additional conditions of sentence, including a condition that essentially prohibited her from having contact with anyone outside of prison other than legal counsel (no-contact condition). On appeal, the court agreed with defendant that the no-contact condition was impermissible and unconstitutional. “None of the statutes under which defendant was sentenced contain a reference to the trial court’s authority to prohibit contact with virtually all individuals outside of prison.” In addition, “there is no statute expressly authorizing the trial court to impose a blanket no-contact condition of sentence as was imposed in this case, and we are unaware of any statute that authorizes such a sentence by implication.” Further, as in Lafey, “the trial court did not have the inherent authority to impose the no-contact condition.” It lacked “statutory or inherent authority to impose the no-contact condition, rendering it unauthorized by law.”