Validity of a will; Presumption of undue influence; In re Estate of Karmey; Confidential or fiduciary relationship; Distinguishing Salvner v Salvner

The court held that the probate court did not err in finding a presumption of undue influence and that appellant failed to rebut the presumption. There was no dispute that the second and third factors for the presumption were satisfied. Appellant “would certainly benefit from inheriting the house, and had the opportunity to influence” the decedent’s (Helen) “decision because he was her caregiver and lived in her home.” Thus, the only issue was whether his “relationship with Helen constituted a confidential or fiduciary relationship.” Appellant claimed “that the probate court concluded a fiduciary relationship existed merely because they were mother and son. [He] mischaracterizes the trial court’s reasoning. Unlike in Salvner, in which the children had no more than what appeared to be a standard parent-child relationship with their father, appellant had a profound role in Helen’s life.” The court found that his “relationship with Helen was demonstrably one of inequality, . . . not because it was a mother-son relationship, but because ‘there [was] confidence reposed on one side and the resulting superiority and influence on the other.’” The record supported “the conclusion that appellant had a confidential or fiduciary relationship with Helen. Thus, the probate court did not err when it found a presumption of undue influence.” The probate court further “reasoned that appellant had failed to rebut the presumption of undue influence because ‘there [was] little question’ that” he was her “caretaker” at the time the will was executed, given his “own testimony regarding just how dependent on him Helen was. Additionally, Helen, ‘at the time this Will was created suffered from serious physical and mental health problems which made her very susceptible to such influence.”’ While appellant relied on the medical conclusion that she was not incompetent, the fact “she was not formally declared incompetent does not negate the numerous circumstances the probate court considered rendered Helen ‘a vulnerable adult.’” Appellant also heavily relied “on the testimony of the attorney who drafted the 2018 will that nothing in her meeting with Helen and appellant gave her cause for concern for Helen’s mental health or wellbeing and that she felt Helen entered the will ‘freely and willingly and knowingly.’” But the court found that “the attorney’s limited insight into Helen’s circumstances undermines her testimony.” It held that “it was insufficient in the face of the extensive evidence provided by” appellees. The court affirmed the order declaring the 2018 will invalid.