Termination under § 19b(3)(c)(i); Child’s best interests

Holding that § (c)(i) existed and that the trial court did not clearly err when it held that the termination of respondent-mother’s parental rights was in child-LF’s best interests, the court affirmed. Respondent did “not contest that 182 or more days have elapsed since the issuance of an initial dispositional order in this case.” However, she contended “that she made progress toward the conditions that led to adjudication and she was not given enough time to proceed through her case service plan.” The primary conditions that led to adjudication were her “inability to recognize the seriousness of LF’s medical conditions and her inability to properly take care of LF. Other conditions included respondent’s lack of suitable housing, employment, and transportation. Respondent was ordered to comply with a case service plan, which she partially completed, to rectify these issues. However, she did not benefit from these services.” Also, her “failure to develop these skills presented a risk to LF’s mental and physical well-being.” Respondent asserted “that the trial court should have given more weight to the testimony of [R], who testified at a [5/24] dispositional hearing. [R] is an infant mental health and Baby Court therapist who worked with respondent and LF since [10/23]. She testified that respondent made significant emotional progress and did not agree with the goal change to adoption at the time of that hearing.” The trial court’s decision to disregard this “testimony was a credibility determination that we decline to address anew on appeal.” Respondent also asserted “that not enough consideration was given to LF’s placement in a supported living situation with respondent. However, the trial court expressly considered this option and deemed it unfeasible.” The court found that ultimately, “LF required daily medical assistance to stay alive. The record evidence established that respondent did not understand the severity of LF’s medical conditions and did not develop the skills to care for LF’s basic needs, let alone her extensive medical needs at the time of the termination hearing. This presented a high risk to LF’s safety and well-being.” Likewise, respondent did “not dispute that she still lacked proper housing and transportation at the time of termination.” Given her “failure to benefit from the few services that she complied with throughout the approximately 10 months of proceedings, respondent’s caseworker did not believe that respondent would participate in services and rectify the conditions that led to adjudication if given additional time.” Thus, the trial court did not clearly err by holding “that there was no reasonable likelihood that respondent would rectify the conditions that led to adjudication within a reasonable time.”