Child custody; Established custodial environment (ECE); MCL 722.27(1)(c); Marik v Marik; Great weight of the evidence; MCL 722.28; Berger v Berger; Child’s best interests; MCL 722.23; Best interest factors (a), (b) and (l)

The court held that the trial court did not err by finding the child (TMR) only had an ECE with plaintiff-mother, or in its findings as to best-interest factors (a), (b) and (l). In the judgment of divorce, the parties were granted joint legal custody, but plaintiff was granted physical custody of the parties’ child, TMR. On appeal, the court rejected defendant-father’s argument that the trial court erred by finding that there was only an ECE with plaintiff. Although there was evidence that he “‘stepped up’” after the parties’ separation, he “only did this for limited windows of time during the seven months under the temporary order. Plaintiff continued to be the primary caregiver by caring for TMR during her weeks and for portions of defendant’s weeks.” The evidence also “supported that although defendant expressed love and affection to TMR after the separation, TMR did not reciprocate that affection. This evidence supported that TMR was not under defendant’s care ‘over an appreciable time.’” In addition, the trial court did not err “by considering the entirety of TMR’s life in its” ECE determination, or by finding defendant “needed plaintiff’s assistance for childcare because he was required to utilize her assistance under the temporary order.” Defendant failed “to point to any evidence that clearly preponderates against the trial court’s finding that the child had an [ECE] with plaintiff alone.” The court also rejected his claim that the trial court’s findings regarding three of the best-interest factors were against the great weight of the evidence. As to factor (a), it “credited defendant’s decision not to spend time with TMR during the marriage for the lack of emotional ties between them after the separation.” He could not show that the evidence preponderated against the trial court’s finding that this factor favored plaintiff. As to factor (b), it “acknowledged that defendant started actively parenting TMR after the parties separated, but cited plaintiff’s testimony that defendant did not spend more time with TMR when he was laid off in the winter and that TMR attended daycare when defendant was home during the marriage.” Because the record supported this, the court could not “conclude that the trial court’s finding was against the great weight of the evidence.” Finally, as to factor (l), there was testimony that defendant “had a negative impact on TMR during defendant’s weeks, including a crabby mood, taking more naps than usual, constipation, and behavioral issues such as biting and hitting. These behaviors did not occur during plaintiff’s weeks. This finding was not against the great weight of the evidence.” Affirmed.