Motion for judgment notwithstanding the verdict (JNOV); Jury instructions on nuisance per se; Waiver; The Michigan Zoning Enabling Act (MZEA); MCL 125.3407; Effect of road commission rules; Sufficiency of the evidence to support nuisance claims; Nuisance in fact; Adams v Cleveland-Cliffs Iron Co; Private nuisance; Adkins v Thomas Solvent Co

The court held that the trial court did not err by (1) addressing errors of law in the jury instructions and correcting them in ruling on defendants’ motion for JNOV, (2) concluding a violation of county road commission rules did not support a nuisance per se claim, or (3) determining that the trial evidence “did not support a finding of nuisance in fact as a matter of law.” Thus, the court affirmed the trial court’s grant of defendant’s motion for JNOV. The case arose after defendants bought a vacant lot next to plaintiffs’ home and built a house on the lot. A “jury found defendants liable for nuisance per se” related to their “driveway and nuisance in fact based on the placement of their docks.” The trial court granted defendants’ motion for JNOV, a conditional new trial, and remittitur. On appeal, the court first found that while plaintiffs contended “defendants waived any challenge to the jury instructions and could not” assert that they were erroneous in their JNOV motion, the “key issue was not whether defendants waived their right to challenge the jury instructions. It was the trial court’s subsequent determination that the jury instructions did not reflect the applicable law and its exercise of discretion to correct that error. Therefore, the trial court did not err by addressing errors of law in the jury instructions and correcting those errors in ruling on defendants’ motion for JNOV.” The court also rejected plaintiffs’ argument “that the jury was properly instructed” on the nuisance claims. It determined that a “review of the MZEA does not disclose a zoning ordinance or regulation adopted under it that would constitute a nuisance per se for violation of a road commission rule.” Further, the court did not find “another statute or caselaw that would qualify as ‘otherwise provided by law,’ to support a nuisance per se under MCL 125.3407. Moreover, plaintiffs failed to establish that the MZEA conferred any authority to the Road Commission rules that equated with a zoning ordinance. Therefore, the trial court did not err by determining that a violation of the Road Commission rules did not support a claim of nuisance per se.” As to the sufficiency of the evidence for nuisance in fact, the court held that “plaintiffs failed to establish that defendants’ primary and secondary docks unreasonably interfered with plaintiffs’ use and enjoyment of their property and caused substantial harm.”