Jurisdiction; Standing of a legally incapacitated individual; MCL 700.1105(i); A guardian’s authority; MCL 700.5306(1); MCL 700.5314; In re Guardianship of Malloy; Principle that a legally incapacitated individual is precluded from bringing lawsuits on his or her own behalf; MCR 2.201(E); Rule prohibiting an attorney from representing multiple clients when the representation of one client is directly adverse to, or may materially limit, the attorney’s representation of another client; MRPC 1.7; Killingbeck v Killingbeck; Deference to the Michigan Attorney Grievance Commission (MAGC) on matters of attorney discipline; MCR 9.108(A)

The court held that appellant (a legally incapacitated adult) lacked standing to appeal on her own behalf, and her sister (Melissa) lacked authority to hire an attorney (Strehle) to represent her. It also admonished Strehle for his “lack of professional integrity in seeking to represent both Melissa and appellant” in the probate court, and for his “cavalier and dismissive comments” about the situation at oral argument. The probate court in these consolidated cases: (1) approved the successor trustee’s 12th annual account, (2) appointed a second successor trustee, (3) allowed the 14th and final annual account, and (4) granted the petition to approve the payment of a retainer fee. On appeal, the court determined that appellant’s status as a legally protected individual indicated she did “not have standing to bring this appeal on her own behalf, and instead should have done so through her legal guardian.” In addition, Melissa had “no legal authority to hire an attorney for appellant. Only appellant’s guardian” had that authority. Finally, the court admonished Strehle “for his lack of professional integrity in seeking to represent both Melissa and appellant in the court below, and for his cavalier and dismissive comments when asked by this panel at oral argument to explain the propriety of his working relationship with appellant and Melissa.” It noted Strehle’s “bald claims that no conflict existed do not inspire confidence, nor do they indicate [he] met his duty to comply with MRPC 1.7. There is no evidence that he consulted with Melissa and appellant’s legal guardian about the potential conflict, or that Melissa and appellant’s guardian consented to dual representation.” The court was “gravely concerned that Strehle may have violated MRPC 1.7. However,” it acknowledged “that ‘a breach of the MRPC merely constitutes grounds for invoking the attorney disciplinary process.” It deferred to the MAGC in that regard. Dismissed for lack of jurisdiction.