Compliance with the notice provision of the Court of Claims Act (COCA) (MCL 600.6431); Retroactivity of Christie v Wayne State Univ; Flamont v Department of Corr; Landin v Department of Health & Human Servs; Tyrrell v University of MI

Concluding the facts here were “nearly identical to Landin, and are distinguishable from Flamont,” the court held that Christie did not apply “retroactively in this case in which plaintiff relied upon Tyrrell.” Thus, it affirmed the trial court’s denial of defendant-employer’s summary disposition motion in this case in which plaintiff alleged racial discrimination. Defendant argued the trial court erred in denying summary disposition “because it did not retroactively apply the Supreme Court’s decision in” Christie, which held that plaintiffs must strictly comply with the COCA’s notice provision, “MCL 600.6431, by filing the requisite written notice of a claim with the Court of Claims.” The court noted that while “this case was pending on appeal, a panel of” the court issued a published opinion in Flamont, holding “that Christie has full retroactive effect as it applied to the facts of that case. In Flamont, the plaintiff filed their complaint” before the court issued its opinion in Tyrrell, where it ruled “that plaintiffs were not required to comply with the notice provision of the COCA if the claims were raised in circuit court.” After Flamont was issued, the court decided in another published opinion, Landin, “that ‘Christie does not apply retroactively to circuit court cases that were in a procedural posture wherein Tyrrell’s interpretation of MCL 600.6431 was the law in Michigan during the one-year notice or filing period following accrual of a claim.’” The court noted that “among the situations in which a new rule of law is new for the purposes of resolving the question of its retroactive application are those where an established precedent upon which the parties have relied is overruled.” The Flamont plaintiff “could not argue that Christie overruled a precedent upon which she relied. In stark contrast, Christie overruled a precedent upon which both the plaintiff in Landin and plaintiff in the present case relied, which was Tyrrell.” Thus, the court determined that here, pursuant to Landin, Christie did not apply retroactively “because Tyrrell was a binding precedent during the notice and filing period in this matter[.]”