Brady v Maryland violation; Failure to disclose a ballistics report; Motion for a mistrial; People v Chenault; Whether evidence was exculpatory & material; Relevance; MRE 402; Unfair prejudice; MRE 403; Jury instructions; National Integrated Ballistic Information Network Evidence Worksheet (NIBIN report)

Holding that the trial court abused its discretion in denying defendant’s motion for a mistrial based on a Brady violation, the court vacated her convictions and sentences, and remanded for a new trial. The case arose from a shooting at her home. She was arrested after police initiated a traffic stop while she “was driving a Dodge Durango owned by a third party,” D. Police found “an unloaded handgun in the trunk of the Durango and placed it into evidence.” Defendant first learned during the trial that a ballistics report (a NIBIN report) indicated that gun was not linked to the shooting. After denying her motion for a mistrial or dismissal, the trial court gave two limiting jury instructions. On appeal, the court noted there was “no dispute that the NIBIN report was not timely disclosed to defendant.” As to whether it was exculpatory, she “was charged with crimes associated with the unlawful use of a firearm. The firearm [she] was in possession of when arrested was shown to have no direct link to the shooting as determined in the NIBIN report.” She contended that, “had counsel been aware of the report, she would have moved to exclude the handgun for being more prejudicial than probative.” The court concluded the report was “exculpatory evidence because it demonstrates the firearm found with defendant was not linked to the shooting for which [she] was on trial.” As to whether it was material, the court found merit in her argument that “had she known about the NIBIN report prior to trial, her counsel would have moved to exclude the firearm from being admitted into evidence under MRE 402 and 403.” The probative value of the gun was low and “whatever relevance [it] would have had to the prosecution’s case,” introducing it “was overly prejudicial under MRE 403.” Given that it “had no link to the shooting, admitting it into evidence had the potential to mislead the jury. Further, the prosecution already provided the victim’s testimony of the events as evidence of the shooting. Thus, there was a reasonable chance [it] would have been excluded for being more prejudicial then probative.” In the absence of the gun, “the prosecution would have to rely exclusively on the victim’s testimony of the shooting” and the court found that “lacked indicia of credibility.” It also determined that the trial court’s jury instructions designed to remedy the issue “themselves were a source of error.”