Search & seizure; Motion to suppress evidence obtained after a traffic stop; Probable cause; Effect of the smell of marijuana; Michigan Regulation & Taxation of Marijuana Act (MRTMA); People v Jones; People v Armstrong; A drug-sniffing dog’s alert; People v Clark; A defendant’s nervousness; Distinguishing United States v Saperstein (6th Cir); Sentencing; Proportionality

Concluding that “the trial court properly denied defendant’s motion to suppress” and that his “sentence was not disproportionate or unreasonable,” the court affirmed. He was convicted of delivery or manufacture of meth (3.9 grams) and resisting or obstructing a police officer. He was sentenced to 51 to 240 months for the delivery or manufacture of meth and 121 days for each resisting or obstructing a police officer conviction. Defendant argued “his arrest and subsequent search” violated the Fourth Amendment. He claimed that the facts here, “considered under the totality of circumstances, were insufficient to establish probable cause.” Specifically, defendant argued “that the smell of marijuana no longer provides probable cause to search after the enactment of the” MRTMA. In support of this argument, he asserted that Jones “is no longer a binding precedent.” The court disagreed. It concluded that it “need not decide what, if any, effect the passage of the MRTMA had upon the precedent set by Jones, because the holding in Jones” was not pertinent to defendant’s argument. Although “the trial court noted that Jones stands for the proposition that a canine sniff is not a search as it applied to the circumstances in Jones, whether or not Jones remains a binding precedent does not have any effect on the analysis of the argument that defendant has raised on appeal.” He also relied on Armstrong. But he did “not demonstrate the canine smelled marijuana in this case.” The record showed “the canine alerted twice on the vehicle and that meth[] was found to be possessed by defendant and another passenger.” Finally, he argued “his nervousness was not grounds, on its own, to establish probable cause.” However, his situation was distinguishable from that in the case on which he relied, Saperstein. The court held the record provided “evidence the officers, considering the totality of the circumstances, had a reasonable belief drugs were in the car or on defendant.” Given that they “had enough evidence to establish probable cause, the arrest and subsequent search of defendant was lawful.”