Right to counsel; McCoy v Louisiana; Florida v Nixon; Defense counsel’s concession of defendant’s guilt; Whether defendant told defense counsel he did not want to concede guilt; Trial strategy where defendant refuses to communicate with counsel; Sentencing; Reasonableness & proportionality; People v Posey

The court held that trial counsel’s concession of guilt as to defendant’s trespassing charge did not violate his right to counsel, and his sentences were neither unreasonable nor disproportionate. He was convicted of resisting or obstructing an officer and trespass, arising out of his eviction from his grandmother’s home after she died. He was given concurrent sentences of 24 months to 15 years for each resisting and obstructing, and 90 days for trespass. On appeal, the court rejected his argument that he was denied his right to counsel when trial counsel conceded his guilt as to the trespassing charge during closing argument. “[D]efendant never expressly told counsel that he did not want to concede guilt. Indeed, trial counsel testified that defendant was virtually ‘nonresponsive’ by the time of trial.” His refusal “to communicate with trial counsel forced counsel to defend [him] in a manner that he believed was in defendant’s best interests.” Because he “did not express a contrary instruction, trial counsel properly exercised his discretion in implementing what he reasonably believed was the most prudent trial strategy.” The court noted “defendant acknowledged that he, despite the eviction order, and despite receiving the eviction notice, knowingly remained on the property. [He] made a generalized claim of ownership of the home, but provided no factual support for this claim other than his testimony that his grandmother intended for him to inherit [it] and that he owned a separate property with” her. As such, “trial counsel’s concession was not contrary to defendant’s assertion of innocence because defendant limited communication with counsel and did not ‘vociferously insist[] that he did not engage in the charged acts[.]’” As to his sentences, the court found the trial court’s “lengthy on-the-record reasoning for the sentence it imposed either directly or indirectly addressed, and dispensed with, nearly all” of his claims. It also noted that (1) his modest resistance did not rebut the presumption of proportionality given to his within-guidelines sentence; (2) he “did not appear so distraught as to provide a reasonable explanation for his resistance”; (3) the trial court found his aggressive statements to police were a threat; and (4) the MDOC’s sentence recommendation was not a proper consideration for the court. It also rejected his remaining arguments and noted that the trial court “was not required to sentence defendant to the lowest conceivable term that may satisfy the punishment goal for sentencing, particularly in light of all the other considerable factors in this case.” Affirmed.