Sufficiency of the evidence; AWIGBH; People v Blevins; Intent; People v Stevens; Principle that a victim’s injuries can be probative of a defendant’s intent; People v Dillard; Double jeopardy; Distinguishing People v Barber; Jury instructions; Ineffective assistance of counsel; Failure to make a futile objection; Diminished capacity; People v Carpenter; Unlawfully driving away an auto (UDAA); Using a motor vehicle without authority but without intent to steal (UMVWA)

Finding no errors requiring reversal, the court affirmed defendant’s convictions. He was convicted of AWIGBH, assault by strangulation, and UDAA for assaulting his brother-in-law, Paul. The trial court sentenced him to two years’ probation. On appeal, the court rejected his argument that the evidence was insufficient to support his AWIGBH conviction. “Based on defendant’s threats and his repeated punching of Paul’s face and head, the jury could infer that defendant intended to inflict great bodily harm less than murder.” It could also infer his intent on the basis of Paul’s injuries. Paul testified that “he sustained numerous injuries, including a large contusion to his head, bruising on the right side of his face and mouth, and cauliflower ear.” In addition, even if defendant presented evidence of mental health issues, he cited “no authority to support his assertion that his alleged anxiety diagnosis, reputation for mental health issues, or the fact that he was ‘having a meltdown’ rendered him unable to form the requisite intent to commit” AWIGBH. The court also rejected his claim that because his AWIGBH and assault by strangulation charges arose out of the same conduct, his convictions of both crimes violated double jeopardy. It noted that because the convictions did not arise from a single act of strangulation, this case was distinguishable from Barber. The court next rejected his contention that the trial court erred by failing to instruct the jury on the offense of UMVWA, a necessarily included lesser offense of UDAA. “‘[B]y expressly and repeatedly approving the jury instructions on the record, defendant waived any objection to the [potentially] erroneous instructions.’” And because he “was not entitled to an instruction on UMVWA, [defense] counsel’s failure to request such an instruction does not constitute ineffective assistance.” Finally, the court rejected his invitation to revisit Carpenter as to the issue of diminished capacity, noting it is bound to follow decisions of the Supreme Court.